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INTRODUCTION

With the 1998 federal appropriations bill,' Congress passed a remarkable
rider regulating federal government attomeys. 2 The rider was entitled the
Citizens Protection Act 3 (CPA) and encapsulated a previously proposed statute
that had not survived the committee process. 4 It provided, in pertinent part:

1. See Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Fiscal 1999, H.R.
4328, 105th Cong. (1998) (enacted).
2. See Pub. L. No. 105-277, 113 Stat. 9 (1998) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.A. § 530B (West
Supp. 1998)).
3. 28 U.S.C.A. § 530B (West Supp. 1998).
4. For a description of the legislative history of the CPA, see infra text accompanying note 33.
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§ 530B. Ethical Standards for Attorneys for the Government
(a) An attorney for the Government shall be subject to State laws and
rules, and local Federal court rules, governing attorneys in each State where
such attorney engages in that attorney's duties, to the same extent as other
attorneys in that State.
(b) The Attorney General shall make and amend rules of the Department of
Justice to assure compliance with this section. 5

As will be discussed below, 6 the new legislation capped a personal drive to
limit the power of federal prosecutors by a congressman who believed he had
been improperly investigated. It was adopted in the context of a national debate
over the authority of the Department of Justice to exempt itself from state and
federal district court ethics rules.7 Quite apart from its specific applications,
however, the legislation highlights two sets of basic issues-one substantive and one
jurisdictional. First, are federal prosecutors somehow special for purposes of
ethics regulation, and why? Second, what are the origin and nature of the
powers of Congress, the states, and the federal judiciary to regulate the ethics of
federal prosecutors? This article explores possible responses to these issues.
Senator Orrin Hatch, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, strongly
opposed the new legislation.8 Because of the peculiar circumstances under
which the bill was adopted, its effect was stayed until April 19, 1999. 9 Soon
after the CPA's adoption, efforts began to repeal or rework it.t ° Those efforts
thus far have failed, and the statute has taken effect.
5. 28 U.S.C.A. § 530B(a)-(b).
6. See infra text accompanying note 12.
7. See Fred C. Zacharias, Who Can Best Regulate the Ethics of Federal Prosecutors; Or Who
Should Regulate the Regulators?, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 429, 429-30 & nn.1-2 (1996) (describing
history of the debate); infra note 21. The controversy is outlined infra text accompanying note 25.
8. Senator Hatch decried the sponsors' circumvention of the committee process as well as the
legislation's substance. See 144 CONG. REC. S 12,798-12,800 (1998). Hatch stated:
Under the guise of setting ethical standards for federal prosecutors and other attorneys for the
government, [the legislation] will severely hamper the ability of the Department of Justice to
enforce federal law and cede authority to regulate the practice of law by federal prosecutors
in our federal courts to more than fifty state bar associations.
Id. at S 12798.
9. Many members of Congress opposed allowing such "riders" to the Omnibus Appropriations bill
because they felt that the committee process was being subverted. See 144 CONG. REc. S12,783, 12,792,
12,806 (1998). As a compromise, Congress retained the core of the CPA, but eliminated its broader sections.
See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 105-825 (1998). Implementation of the CPA was delayed for six months.

10. Senator Hatch has introduced a proposed bill entitled the "Federal Prosecutor Ethics Act." S.
250, 106th Cong. (1999). The proposal would in large measure return the law to its pre-CPA state,
amending the core of the CPA to read as follows:
A federal prosecutor shall not be subject to a State law or rule governing ethical conduct of
attorneys, to the extent that the State law or rule is inconsistent with Federal law or interferes
with the effectuation of Federal law or policy, including the investigation of violations of

Federal law.
Id. The proposal contains other provisions that require federal attorneys to obey standard ethics standards that
concededly apply to federal attorneys, calls for enforcement, and establishes a "Commission on Federal
Prosecutorial Enforcement" to review particular inconsistencies between state and federal law.
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Part I of this article describes the background and history of the new
legislation. Part II then discusses its possible practical implications for existing
state and federal law. Those who supported the legislation for the purpose of
resolving the national debate over specific Department of Justice regulations
will be surprised to learn of the potentially broad scope of the law they actually
adopted.
As might be expected of legislation that did not endure the committee
oversight process, the CPA is remarkably unclear. One cannot tell from the text
of the law whether the CPA is limited to regulating prosecutorial ethics in the
traditional sense.l" One cannot tell how far it extends in curtailing the power of
federal prosecutors, in changing the power of the possible regulators of federal
prosecutors, or in delegating the authority of Congress. The legislation's simple
language, which on the surface addresses all aspects of the regulation of
prosecutorial ethics, masks the complexity of the issues. Understanding this
fundamental failing of the CPA is important because it highlights the need for
regulators of federal prosecutorial ethics to tailor ethics standards to their
reasons for regulating.
Part III identifies three substantive reasons why, for purposes of ethics
regulation, regulators might wish to distinguish federal prosecutors. First, prosecutors, in general, may be different than private attorneys. Second, federal
prosecutors may be different than state prosecutors. Finally, federal prosecutors
who litigate national cases exclusively in federal court may be different than
ordinary litigators.
The question of whether federal prosecutors are "ethically unique" has
simmered beneath the surface of the debate about the Department of Justice's
efforts to exempt itself from state codes. But surprisingly, no one has addressed
the conceptual question directly. The CPA seems to reject all three visions of
federal prosecutors as distinctive, but it is unclear whether its sponsors considered any of them.
In rushing past the issues, the CPA's sponsors may have created serious
obstacles to the effective administration of federal law enforcement. Perhaps
more importantly, because the sponsors rejected unthinkingly the notion of a

Id. § 530B(c)-(d). A democratic alternative to Senator Hatch's proposal has also been circulated. See S.
855, 106th Cong. (1999). This bill, introduced by Senator Patrick Leahy and entitled the "Professional
Standards for Government Attorneys Act of 1999," would amend the federal judicial code so as to
subject government attorneys appearing before a court to the rules of conduct of that court. See id.
§ 530B(b)(1). With respect to all other conduct, the government attorney is to be governed by the
"standards established by the rules and decisions of the state in which the attorney is licensed to
practice." Id. § 530B(b)(2). The bill also requires the Judicial Conference of the United States to submit
recommendations for amending the Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure to create a uniform
national rule governing federal attorneys' conduct. See id. § 530B(c).
11. The CPA contains a subtitle, "Ethical Standards for Attorneys for the Government." See 28
U.S.C.A. § 530B. However, the text of the CPA does not confine itself to ethics standards. Even if the
subtitle is interpreted to limit the CPA's reach, many laws and rules other than state ethics codes
encompass the goal of setting "ethical standards" for prosecutorial behavior. See id.
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unique federal prosecution corps, the legislation raises theoretical and legal
issues that have significant implications for the future regulation of prosecutorial ethics.
Part IV addresses the jurisdictional issues that the CPA brings to the fore:
what are the source and extent of the powers of Congress, the states, and the
federal judiciary to regulate the ethics of federal prosecutors? The CPA's broad
assertion of power to determine who may regulate federal prosecutors presses
the limits of congressional authority and invites litigation regarding that authority.
A few commentators have touched upon isolated aspects of the regulatory
power of particular branches, but no one has acknowledged the complexity of
the broader jurisdictional issues. Part IV highlights and opens the debate on
these issues. Congress, in its proposed re-evaluation of the CPA, will need to
address them.
If the CPA survives for long, courts inevitably will confront the jurisdictional
issues in deciding challenges to specific state regulation of prosecutorial ethics.
If, instead, the legislation is repealed or amended, confrontation between potential regulators can be avoided for a time. Nevertheless, in determining what
steps they should take to produce or avoid a confrontation in future regulation,
Congress, federal judges, and the Attorney General will need to assess the limits
of their own authority and the risks and rewards of pressing that authority to the
hilt.
I. THE

HISTORY OF THE

CPA

A. BACKGROUND

On May 5, 1992, a federal grand jury indicted Congressman Joseph McDade
on five counts of bribery-related offenses. 12 The indictment alleged, inter alia,
that McDade had accepted real and sham campaign contributions in exchange
for using his influence on behalf of various government contractors and their
lobbyists.' 3 McDade issued an immediate press release admitting that "errors
had been made," but denied the essence of the allegations. 14 He retained his
seat in Congress. 15 Four years later, he was acquitted by a jury of all charges. 16
12. See United States v. McDade, No. 92-249, 1992 WL 151314, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 19, 1992)
(denying evidentiary hearing on motion to dismiss).
13. See id. at 1 (describing allegations of indictment); see also Tokens of Gratitude: Rep. Joseph
McDadeAccused of Bribe-Taking, TIME, May 18, 1992, at 19 (reporting indictment).
14. Michael deCourcy Hinds, Top Republican on a House Panel is Charged with Accepting Bribes,
N.Y. TtMEs, May 6, 1992, at Al; see also Robert E. Kessler, Indictment: Congressman Took Bribes
From LI Firms, NEWSDAY, May 6, 1992, at 2 (reporting McDade as referring to indictment as "fishing
expedition").
15. See Defense Cleanup:McDade to Rule Over DOE's Budget, INFO. AccEss Co., Nov. 29, 1996, at
2 (discussing McDade's postindictment committee assignments).
16. See Eric Pianin, Rep. McDade Acquitted of Bribery, Racketeering Charges,WASH. POST, Aug. 2,
1996, at A15; cf. Federal Prosecutors: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual
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Even as the indictment was handed down, McDade complained that federal
investigators had harassed and hounded him and that they had "turned his life
into 'a living nightmare.' "17 During the criminal proceedings, McDade filed
numerous motions claiming prosecutorial misconduct and violations of ethics9
interest.'
standards, 1 8 including one motion that alleged a significant conflict of
All of McDade's motions were dismissed or made moot by the acquittal.2 °
Roughly simultaneously with the investigation and prosecution of Congressman McDade, the Department of Justice became embroiled in a separate
controversy with state bar organizations regarding the obligation of federal
2
prosecutors to comply with state and federal court rules of ethics. ' The
controversy centered on two professional rules, one a long-standing rule prohibiting lawyers from contacting represented parties 22 and the second a newer rule
limiting prosecutors' ability to subpoena witnesses.2 3 During the Bush Administration, Attorney General Richard Thornburgh circulated an internal memorandum that purported to exempt Department of Justice attorneys from such state
ethics rules and local federal court rules that adopted them.24 In 1994, Attorney
Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996) (testimony of Rep. Joseph
McDade) (reporting chronology of his prosecution).
17. Hinds, supra note 14, at Al.
18. See, e.g., United States v. McDade, 827 F. Supp. 1153 (E.D. Pa. 1993), affd, 28 F.3d 283 (3d
Cir. 1994) (denying various defense motions); United States v. McDade, No. 92-249, 1992 WL 382351,
at *2-3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 1992) (denying motion based on government's impropriety in delivering too
many documents in response to discovery requests); United States v. McDade, No. 92-249, 1992 WL
187036, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 30, 1992) (denying motion to dismiss because of prosecutor's conflict of
interest), cf. United States v. McDade, No. 92-249, 1995 WL 476230, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 7, .1995)
(denying motion to exclude government's expert testimony).
19. See McDade, 1992 WL 187036, at *2 (denying motion).
20. See supra note 18.
21. The history of these events is well documented. See generally Roger C. Cramton & Lisa K.
Udell, State Ethics Rules and Federal Prosecutors: The Controversies over the Anti-contact and
Subpoena Rules, 53 U. Prrr. L. REV. 291 passim (1992); Corinna Barrett Lain, ProsecutorialEthics
under the Reno Rule: Authorized by Law?, 14 CRIM. JUST. ETIcs 17, 22-24 (Summer/Fall 1995)
(discussing DOJ's regulatory power under APA); Rory K. Little, Who Should Regulate the Ethics of
Federal Prosecutors?, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 355, 406-10 (1996); Amy R. Mashburn, A Clockwork
Orange Approach to Legal Ethics: A Conflicts Perspective on the Regulation of Lawyers by Federal
Courts, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcS 473, 479-90 nn. 22-64 (1995); Alafair S.R. Burke, Note, Reconciling
ProfessionalEthics and ProsecutorialPower: The No-Contact Rule Debate, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1635,
1650-61 (1994); William Delker, Comment, Ethics and the Federal Prosecutor: The Continuing
Conflict over the Application of Model Rule 4.2 to FederalAttorneys, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 855, 858-59
nn.16-19 (1995).
22. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.2 (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES];
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONStBtLITY DR 7-102 (1969) [hereinafter MODEL CODE].

23. See MODEL RULES, supra note 22, Rule 3.8(f). For discussions of Model Rule 3.8(f), see
generally Fred C. Zacharias, A Critical Look at Rules Governing Grand Jury Subpoenas of Attorneys,
76 MINN. L. REV. 917, 917-19 nn. 1, 5 (1992); Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in ProfessionalResponsibility Codes: Theory, Practice,and the Paradigmof ProsecutorialEthics, 69 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 223
(1993).
24. See Richard L. Thornburgh, Memorandum from Attorney General to all Justice Department
Litigators 1 (June 8, 1989) [hereinafter Thornburgh Memorandum], reprintedin In re Doe, 801 F. Supp.
478, 489 (D.N.M. 1992); see also Richard L. Thornburgh, Ethics and the Attorney General, 74
JUDIcATuRE 290 (1991) (justifying Thornburgh Memorandum).
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General Janet Reno promulgated formal regulations continuing the exemption
(the Reno Rule),2 5 while promising that the Department of Justice would, in
general, voluntarily adhere to most professional rules.26
The Justice Department's position sparked significant media and scholarly
attention. 27 Numerous lawsuits raised the legal issues surrounding the Department's claims that the Supremacy Clause 2 8 authorized its preemption of state
ethics rules 29 and that separation of powers considerations foreclosed federal
courts from adopting and applying state rules to federal prosecutors.3 ° Congress
considered intervening in the controversy in 1990. 3 1 It chose instead to warn the
25. 28 C.F.R. § 77 (1994), explained in Communications With Represented Persons, 59 Fed. Reg.
39,910 (1994) [hereinafter Reno Rule]. Reno initially asserted a virtually unlimited right of Justice
Department lawyers to contact unrepresented parties preindictment, in violation of many state professional codes. See Proposed Justice Department Rule on Communications with Represented Persons, 58
Fed. Reg. 39,976 (1993) (detailing early history of proposed rule). The Justice Department then
withdrew its proposed regulation. See Proposed Justice Department Rule Governing Communications
with Represented Persons, 59 Fed. Reg. 10,086 (1994) (detailing history). Subsequently, the Department reissued the regulation in its current form.
26. See id. at 10,086 ("[F]ederal attorneys generally continue to be subject to state bar ethical rules
where they are licensed to practice, except in the limited circumstances where state ethical rules clearly
conflict with -lawful federal procedures and practices.").
27. See authorities cited supra notes 7, 21 & 23; see also John Flynn Rooney, ThornburghSays ABA
Rules Hurt Prosecutor's Efforts, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Aug. 6, 1990, at 1 (reporting dispute between
Department of Justice and ABA); Tom Watson, AG Decrees Prosectuors May Bypass Counsel, LEGAL
TtMEs, Sept. 25, 1989, at 1, 29 (media report of controversy leading up to Thornburgh Memo); Tom
Watson, ProsecutorsSee ABA as "Arm of the Defense Bar" LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 17, 1990, at 6 (same);
Playing Politics,NAT'L L.J., Aug. 20, 1990, at 12 (criticizing Thornburgh Memo).
28. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
29. See Reno Rule, supra note 25, at 39,916 (Justice Department maintains that it may preempt state
regulation "whenever the agency, in doing so, is acting within the proper scope of its congressionally
delegated authority"); see also, e.g., Kolibash v. Committee on Legal Ethics, 872 F.2d 571, 575 (4th
Cir. 1989) (finding "colorable claim" that Supremacy Clause bars state enforcement against federal
prosecutors of state's antisubpoena rule); In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 480 (D.N.M. 1992) (rejecting
Supremacy Clause argument). For discussions of the preemption issues as they apply to the no-contacts
debate, see, for example, Samuel Dash, An Alarming Assertion of Power, 78 JUDICATURE 137, 138-40
(1994) (arguing against Justice Department's position); Lain, supra note 21, at 22-23 (arguing against
Reno Rule); Little, supra note 21, at 378-79, 382-411 (supporting Department of Justice's position); F.
Dennis Saylor & J. Douglas Wilson, Putting a Square Peg in a Round Hole: The Application of Model
Rule 4.2 to Federal Prosecutors, 53 U. Prrr. L. REv. 459, 483-85 (1992) (arguing that Supremacy
Clause forbids state regulation of federal prosecutors); Delker, supra note 21, at 878-81 (criticizing
Justice Department's position); Jocelyn Lupert, Note, The Department of Justice Rule Governing
Communications with Represented Persons: Has the Department Defied Ethics?, 46 SYRACUSE L. REv.
1119, 1132-36 (1996) (analyzing Justice Department position); Todd S. Shulman, Note, Wisdom
Without Power: The Department of Justice's Attempt to Exempt Federal Prosecutorsfrom State
No-Contact Rules, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1067, 1085-93 (1996) (focusing on preemption issue); Zacharias,
supra note 7, at 431-39 (suggesting that the preemption issue is complex).
30. See Reno Rule, supra note 25, at 39,917 (arguing that it would raise separation of powers
concerns if courts were to regulate day-to-day activities of executive branch attorneys in the exercise of
alleged "supervisory power"); see also, e.g., Whitehouse v. United States Dist. Court, 53 F.3d 1349,
1366 (1st Cir. 1995) (upholding federal local court rule applying state ethics provision against federal
prosecutors); United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1461 (9th Cir. 1993) (requiring prosecutorial
compliance with California no-contacts rule); United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 664, 667 (1st Cir.
1987) (en banc) (same); see also authorities cited in Little, supra note 21, at 409-10 nn. 296-99.
31. See HOUSE COMM. ON Gov'T OPERATIONS, FEDERAL PROSECUTORIAL AUTHORITY IN A CHANGING
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Department of Justice to beware of future congressional oversight. 32
B. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Shortly after his acquittal, Congressman McDade introduced the first version
of the CPA.3 3 The Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property held
hearings on September 12, 1996.3 4 Congressman McDade was the first witness 35 and was followed by an Associate Deputy Attorney General 36 and a panel
of organizational witnesses 37 who focused on the Reno Rule and its effect on
state ethics provisions forbidding contacts with represented persons. 38 Congressman McDade referred to his personal experiences, asserting his "first-hand
39
knowledge of the overzealousness and excessiveness of federal prosecutors.",
Although McDade further asserted that "the power of prosecutors is tremendous and the problem of misconduct is serious,", 40 the only specifics of his
testimony focused on the adoption of the Reno Rule. 4' McDade characterized
the proposed legislation as a response to the Justice Department's regulation.4 2
The subcommittee took the bill under advisement.43
The bill was reintroduced in the next Congress, 44 characterized as a bill "to
H.R. REP. No. 101-986, at 32 (1990) ("We disagree
with the Attorney General's attempts to exempt departmental attorneys from compliance with the
ethical requirements adopted by the State bars to which they belong and in the rules of the Federal
Courts before which they appear.").
32. See id. at 36 (warning Department of Justice that Congress would oversee progress in the
no-contacts controversy).
33. The bill was introduced as the Ethical Standards for Federal Prosecutors Act of 1996. See H.R.
3386, 104th Cong. (1996).
34. See Ethical Standardsfor FederalProsecutorsAct of 1996: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996) [hereinafter
Legislative Hearings].
35. See id. at 6 (testimony of Rep. Joseph McDade).
36. See id. at 11 (testimony of Seth Waxman, Associate Attorney General).
37. The Subcommittee heard testimony from representatives of the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers, the American Corporate Counsel Association, and the CATO Institute. See id. at
57-98 (testimony of Tim Evans, Member of Board of Directors, National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers; Frederick J.Krebs, President, American Corporate Counsel Association; and Roger
Pilon, Director, CATO Institute).
38. Tim Evans of the National Association of Criminal Defense lawyers characterized the bill as "a
much needed, long overdue measure to reign in professed self-policing prosecutors run amok, and to
end the reign of prosecutorial imperialism begat by, the roundly condemned 'Thornburgh Memorandum' of June 1989." Id. at 60 (testimony of Tim Evans). Roger Pilon, from the CATO Institute testified
that "however prudent the [Reno] rule may or may not be, it is presumptuous at least for the
department to be telling the rest of us that it and it alone will set the rules for the conduct of its
attorneys-suggesting an arrogance that has led many critics to the charge, 'above the law.' " Id. at 96
(testimony of Roger Pilon).
39. Id. at 7 (testimony of Rep. Joseph McDade).
40. Id. at 10 (statement of Rep. Joseph McDade).
41. See id. at 8.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 106.
44. It was reintroduced as the Ethical Standards for Federal Prosecutors Act of 1997. See H.R. 232,
105th Cong. (1997).
LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: MoRE ATENTION REQUIRED,
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amend title 28, United States Code, to require prosecutors in the Department of
Justice to be ethical.", 45 It was referred to the House Committee on the
Judiciary, but the Committee took no action. 46
In March of 1998, Congressman McDade introduced an expanded version of
the legislation, including not only the legislation that was ultimately adopted,
but also standards of conduct for all Justice Department employees and a
provision establishing a review board to monitor compliance.4 7 The new legisla48
tion was submitted to the Committee on the Judiciary for further review.
The portion of the legislation now known as the CPA somehow was received
by the Committee on Appropriations in July of 1998. 4 9 A modified version of
the CPA was included as a rider to the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Bill for the Fiscal Year 1999,50 which was debated
on the floor of the Senate in late October of 1998. 5' Over the vociferous
objection of Senator Hatch, 52 whose oversight committee had been bypassed,
53
the appropriations act was adopted with the rider intact.
II. THE CPA's PRACTICAL EFFECT

AND ISSUES OF INTERPRETATION

One aspect of the legislation is self evident: the CPA is intended to regulate
federal prosecutors more stringently and to limit their powers. This goal can be
45. Id.
46. See supra note 34 & accompanying text.
47. The bill, entitled the Citizens Protection Act of 1998, included the Ethical Standards for Federal
Prosecutors Act of 1996, but added a list of ten acts of punishable prosecutor misconduct, sanctions for
prosecutorial misconduct, and a provision to create a "Misconduct Review Board" appointed by the President of the United States and leaders of both the House and Senate. H.R. 3396, 105th Cong. (1998).
48. See id. (introduction to proposed bill).
49. By March 27, 1998, 22 days after its introduction, the bill had 33 cosponsors. See 144 CONG.
REc. H1699 (1998). However, because no Committee proceedings took place and no action was taken
on H.R. 3396, it lost its status as independent legislation.
Congressman McDade was a member of the House Appropriations Committee and prevailed upon
the Committee to include the Citizens Protection Act in the bill covering appropriations for the
Departments of State, Commerce, Justice, and the Judiciary. See H.R. 4276, 105th Cong. (1998). In
hearings before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Departments of Commerce, Justice, and
State, the Judiciary, the president of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers spoke in
support of the bill. See Regarding the Fiscal Year 1999 Appropriationsfor Defender Services: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Dept's of Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary,105th Cong. (1998).
The Citizens Protection Act was included in the proposed appropriations bill for the Departments of
Commerce, State, and Justice and the Judiciary for fiscal year ending September 30, 1999. See H.R.
4276. Representative Hutchinson moved to strike the Citizens Protection Act, but the House voted
345-82 against the amendment. See 144 CONG. REC. H7226 (1998). One successful amendment
extended the CPA to include independent counsels. See 144 CONG. REC. H7229 (1998).
50. The appropriations bill was received in the Senate on August 31, 1998, at which time several
appropriations bills, including H.R. 4276, were rolled into one larger Omnibus Spending bill. See H.R.
4328, 105th Cong. (1998). A compromise version of the Citizens Protection Act made its way through
the conference process. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-825 (1998).
51. See 144 CONG. REC. S12,696-12,716, S12,741-12,810 (1998).
52. See 144 CONG. REc. S12,798 (1998).
53. See Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-118 (1998). The President signed the $520 billion
Omnibus Spending bill into law on October 21, 1998. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 530B.
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gleaned both from Congressman McDade's personal antipathy toward the federal prosecution corps and from the fact that the legislation reacted to the Reno
Rule's attempt to insulate the Department of Justice. Far less clear, however, is
how the CPA will effectuate an increase in regulation.
A. CHANGES IN THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF FEDERAL PROSECUTORS

On one level, the CPA changes how federal prosecutors should be viewed. As
we discuss in detail in Part II, federal prosecutors have long considered
themselves unique in several respects. Because of their resources, the breadth of
the statutes they enforce, and their national jurisdiction, federal prosecutors
have always seemed different than state prosecutors. The Justice Department's
54
self-perception, in part, is what led to the Reno Rule. One interpretation of the
CPA is that it now requires federal prosecutors to be treated like state prosecutors.

The CPA may, however, go further. All prosecutors consider themselves
governed by different rules and ethical mandates than private lawyers. One
can interpret the CPA's words "to the same extent as other attorneys in that
State" 5 6 as reducing the status of federal prosecutors. In other words, the CPA
may subject federal prosecutors to more regulation than state prosecutors,
treating federal prosecutors like private attorneys. Although counterintuitive,
this interpretation may be consistent with the antipathy toward federal prosecutors felt by the legislation's chief sponsor.
Finally, federal prosecutors-who practice almost exclusively in federal
court-typically view themselves as federal litigators. Federal litigators historically have been subjected more to the rules of local federal courts in which they
practice than to the rules of their licensing states. Again, one can interpret the
CPA as undermining not only this self-perception, but also the ability of federal
to the
courts to control its own processes. The CPA subjects federal prosecutors
57
rules.",
court
local
Federal
"and
state
of
simultaneous regulation
B. CHANGES IN THE NATURE OF RESTRICTIONS
GOVERNING FEDERAL PROSECUTORS

At a second, more practical, level, the CPA changes what federal prosecutors
can do and the nature of the regulation that limits them. Federal prosecutors
58
always have conceded that they are subject to federal law. Explicit terms of
the CPA make federal prosecutors subject to at least three additional sources of
54. See Reno Rule, supra note 25, at 39,911, 39,914 (asserting that national prosecutions require
immunity from nonuniform state rules).
55. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can
ProsecutorsDo Justice?,44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 103-09 (1991) (discussing psychology of prosecutors).
56. 28 U.S.C.A. § 530B(a).
57. 28 U.S.C.A. § 530B.
58. Cf 4B Op. Off. Legal Counsel 576, 581 (1980) (considering argument by federal law enforcement authorities that they are subject "only to the Constitution, federal statutes, and regulations").
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regulation: state laws, state rules, and local federal court rules. By implication,
the CPA may also subject federal prosecutors to the gloss upon professional
rules that are produced in state court opinions and other expressions of state
disciplinary authorities.59
The pertinent portion of the CPA is labeled "Ethical Standards for Attorneys
for the Government." Yet the text of the CPA nowhere limits itself to rules or
law specifically governing legal ethics. One could interpret the CPA narrowly,
by characterizing the label as an implicit limitation of the CPA's terms. It is,
however, equally plausible to interpret the CPA's provisions literally, as incorpo-

rating all state law that bears on lawyers' professional conduct.6 °
So interpreted, the CPA would expose federal prosecutors to a broad variety
of existing state legislation and an infinite range of limitations that state
regulators may see fit to adopt in the future. For example, federal prosecutors
supervising investigations currently may seek wiretap authority under the federal Wire and Electronic Communications Interception and Interception of Oral
Communications Act. 6 1 This statute requires only that federal prosecutors prove
that a wiretap may provide evidence of defined crimes in order to obtain wiretapping authority. 62 Under the CPA, federal prosecutors may now also be bound
by stricter provisions in state wiretapping statutes 63 and state privacy laws. 64

59. Although the CPA does not expressly mention these sources of regulation, it does purport to
subject federal prosecutors to state regulation "to the same extent and in the same manner as other
attorneys in that State." 28 U.S.C.A. § 530B(a). If local attorneys are bound by the determinations of
state courts or disciplinary agencies, these presumably become part of the rules that are being
interpreted.
60. One quirky recent opinion that applies the CPA attributes great weight to the title. See United
States v. Colorado Supreme Court, No. 98-1081, 1999 WL 679678 (10th Cir. 1999). The Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals interprets the words "ethical standards" as both limiting and expanding the legislation's scope. In determining whether the CPA requires federal prosecutors to abide by a state version of
Model Rule 3.8(f), the court holds that the CPA incorporates only those professional rules that are
ethical in nature. See id. at *6. The court defines "ethical" as "conduct unbecoming a member of the
bar" and considers three factors in deciding whether Rule 3.8(f) rises to the ethical level: that the rule
bars "conduct recognized by consensus within the profession as inappropriate"; that the rule is a
"commandment dealing with morals and principles"; and that the rule is "directed at the attorney
herself." Id. at *6-9. By implication, the court suggests (1) the CPA does not encompass all professional rules, and (2) the CPA does encompass state rules found outside the professional codes but which
share the characteristics of "ethics."
61. 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1994).
62. See id. (enumerating offenses the detection of which justifies wiretapping).
63. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 934.03, 934.09 (1998) (enumerating limited number of offenses for
which wiretaps are acceptable and providing procedural limitations on interception of oral communications); cf. Mozo v. State, 632 So. 2d 623, 629 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994), aft'd, 655 So. 2d 1115 (1995)
(noting that Florida Security of Communications Act evinces greater concern for protection of privacy
interests in conversation than does federal Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act).
64. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All people are by nature free and independent and have
inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and
protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy."); FLA. CONST. art. 1,
§ 12 (protecting right "against the unreasonable interception of private communications"); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5703, 5704 (West 1999) (making it felony to intercept telephone communications
except under specified circumstances).
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The incorporation of state law may interpose other obstacles to federal law
enforcement as well. State evidentiary rules, if codified as in California,65 may
apply. Thus, for example, a state's expansive view of attorney-client privilege
may supervene a narrower federal common-law rule.66 Where federal law limits
defense discovery by statute, as in the federal Jencks Act,6 7 state law now may
govern. 68 To be sure, when state and federal law are in direct conflict, federal
law will continue to govern. 69 However, in situations in which state law simply
adds to federal constraints on prosecutors, the CPA arguably incorporates the
supplemental regulation.
As significant as the impact of incorporated state law may be, incorporated
state "rules" may be even more burdensome to federal prosecutions. The
caption of the CPA70 suggests that the main focus of the "rules" aspect of the
CPA is state ethics codes. Arguably, however, state discovery rules that go
beyond federal discovery rules are incorporated as well. Thus, in states in which
open discovery is mandated7 '-often on the basis of some reciprocal discovery
requirement 72 or other tradeoffs in the criminal process designed to maintain an
adversarial balance 73-federal prosecutors may no longer be able to claim the

65. See CAL. Evtn. CODE § 1-1605 (West 1991).
66. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.5025 (West 1999) (expanding attorney-client privilege to include
communications made by person who seeks or receives services from Department of Revenue under
child support enforcement program); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4503 (McKinney 1998) (including expansive
definition of privilege and including commentary C4503, which notes that "CPLR 4503 offers greater
protection for attorney-client communications than does the common law").
Similarly, federal law does not recognize an accountant-client privilege. See Couch v. United States,
409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973) (rejecting privilege). However, many states have either explicitly extended
the attorney-client privilege to an attorney's agent, including the accountant, or have created standalone accountant-client privileges. See Denzil Causey & Frances McNair, An Analysis of State
Accountant-ClientPrivilege Statutes and Public Policy Implicationsfor the Accountant-Client Relationship, 27 Am. Bus. L.J. 535, 538 (1990) (noting that 24 jurisdictions have adopted some form of
accountant privilege statute).
67. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1994) (requiring disclosure of witness statements only after witness has
testified).
68. Thus, for example, the Jencks Act requires the government to turn over witness statements to the
defense, but only after the witness has testified. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1994). In marked contrast, some
states allow the defense to take pretrial depositions of potential prosecution witnesses. See, e.g.,
ALASKA STAT. § 15(a) (Michie 1994); FLA. STAT. ch. 3.220(d) (1973); IND. CODE § 35-37-4-3 (1994).
69. In other words, the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution will govern so long as the subject is
one over which the federal government has regulatory power. See U.S. CONST. art. VI.
70. The CPA characterizes itself as establishing "Ethical Standards for Attorneys for the Government." 28 U.S.C.A. § 530B.
71. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.1 (West 1999) (requiring prosecutors to disclose, inter alia,
witness statements and all real evidence obtained as part of investigation); MASS. R. CRIM. P. 14 (West
1999) (requiring full disclosure of all evidence in possession of prosecution, including full probation
department records of all prospective prosecution witnesses).
72. See, e.g., Mass. R. CuiM. P. 14(a)(3) (West 1999) (conditioning open discovery on significant
discovery rights of prosecution, after defense has requested discovery); Hobbs v. People, 284 Cal. Rptr.
655 (Cal Ct. App. 1991), overruled on other grounds sub nom., People v. Tillis, 18 Cal. 4th 284, 295
(1998) (discussing reciprocal aspect of California's open discovery rules).
73. See, e.g., FLA. R. CrIM. P. 3.220(b)(4)(i) (entitling prosecutor to receive defense witness
statements after defendant requests statements from prosecution).
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benefits of the more limited Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.74
Here, again, the CPA produces a unique issue of interpretation. Where
practice rules are concerned, one ordinarily would expect federal rules to apply
in federal court and state rules to apply in state court. Intended or not, the terms
of the CPA seem to prescribe a change in this long-standing principle.
C. CHANGES IN THE APPLICABILITY OF STATE ETHICS STANDARDS

The most immediate effects of the CPA are in its incorporation of state ethics
rules. These clearly are intended to apply to federal prosecutors. Controversy
over their applicability provided the stimulus for the CPA.75
Interestingly, the CPA may not end the debate regarding the particular ethics
provision that lay at the heart of the controversy-the "no contact with represented persons" rule.76 The American Bar Association formulation of this rule,
and most state versions that the CPA incorporates, allow prosecutors to contact
represented persons "when authorized by law to do So."' 77 Federal regulations
such as the Reno Rule arguably are authorizing "law.", 78 In the aftermath of the
new legislation, states may choose to amend away the exception. 79 Nevertheless, it
is ironic that the CPA, as it stands, may not eliminate the very claim of authority
to avoid state standards that prompted the CPA itself.
74. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (providing limited discovery rights to defense).
75. See supra text accompanying note 21.
76. MODEL RuLEs, supra note 22, Rule 4.2.
77. Id. At least 41 jurisdictions have adopted this limiting provision, including Alabama, Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Hawaii,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
78. Reno Rule, supra note 25, at 39,916-17 (asserting that federal regulations have same preemptive
force as legislation that authorized them). If federal regulations are federal law, they presumably
preempt conflicting state law. See, e.g., Little, supra note 21, at 378-84 (arguing that Justice Department rulemaking does preempt state law); Zacharias, supra note 7, at 440 (discussing question of
whether Department of Justice regulations are "law").
The CPA attempts to foreclose the conflict between Justice Department regulations and state rules by
requiring the Attorney General to "amend rules of the Department of Justice to assure compliance"
with the CPA. 28 U.S.C.A. § 530B(b). Yet, under the terms of the CPA, compliance simply requires
federal attorneys to be "subject to State law and rules." 28 U.S.C.A. § 530B(a). Unless state law
prohibits federal regulations, promulgating federal regulations does not necessarily undermine compliance. This conclusion is obvious with respect to no-contacts provisions that refer to "other law," but the
conclusion is equally reasonable with respect to state laws that silently acknowledge the possibility of
preemption by a higher authority.
79. It may be difficult for Congress to craft a general provision that would retain Congress's ability
to preempt state law while eliminating the possibility of Justice Department preemption. On a specific
issue, such as the no-contacts-with-represented-persons controversy, Congress easily can remove the
Justice Department's authority to override state rules simply by regulating the subject directly. It is
quite another matter to declare somehow that federal regulations are not federal law for purposes of the
Supremacy Clause. The difficulty comes in trying to craft legislation that leaves the Department the
general rulemaking authority that it needs to carry out its functions, while at the same time limiting the
force of particular kinds of departmental rules. Cf. infra text accompanying note 222 (discussing
argument that the Executive may have independent power to preempt or withstand state law).
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In other respects, however, the CPA is less forgiving. It specifically requires
federal prosecutors to abide by state ethics standards, regardless of whether
local federal courts have adopted them and regardless of whether they interfere
with effective law enforcement. The CPA invites state bar organizations dominated by the private bar to lobby state courts and legislatures to adopt provisions
constraining prosecutors. 80 At least one such provision is already a source of
controversy: ethics rules adopted in numerous states significantly limit prosecutorial authority to subpoena lawyers to give unprivileged information at trial or
before the grand jury.8 ' Other limiting ethics rules that already exist in some
82
states expand prosecutors' obligation to disclose evidence to the defense,
83 require
require prosecutors to expose exculpatory evidence to grand juries,
84
prosecutors to discourage public statements by law enforcement personnel,
and limit the prosecutor's (but not the defense's) ability to discourage witnesses
from cooperating with their adversaries. 85 By authorizing states to regulate
federal prosecutors, the CPA may encourage the adoption of new ethics provisions defining prosecutors' special responsibilities.8 6
80. Procedural questions surrounding the CPA also raise the specter of obstacles to law enforcement.
First, by filing ethics charges against federal attorneys, litigants in cases involving the federal government may be able to force disclosures that would not be required in the underlying litigation. Second,
there is a serious question regarding which jurisdictions have authority to prosecute federal attorneys
for violating state ethics rules-the jurisdiction in which an attorney is licensed, the home jurisdiction
of his agency, the jurisdiction in which he ordinarily practices, or the jurisdiction in which he appears in
a case pro hac vice. Cf.United States v. Ferrara, 54 F.3d 825, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that New
Mexico ethics rule governed conduct of Assistant U.S. Attorney licensed in New Mexico but practicing
in District of Columbia, but finding lack of jurisdiction to challenge New Mexico's disciplinary action
in District of Columbia courts).
81. See, e.g., MODEL RuLEs, supra note 22, Rule 3.8(f)(3) (forbidding subpoenas to lawyers unless
information sought is unprivileged and essential and "there is no feasible alternative to obtain the
information"). Some jurisdictions that follow the ABA's model have added the proviso that prosecutors
must seek judicial approval before issuing such subpoenas. See, e.g., MASS. RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDucT Rule 3.8(0 (1999); PA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.10 (1998); VA. CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 8-102 (1995); see also Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA)
55:1303 (1997) (identifying 10 states that have adopted ethics rules that in some form limit prosecutors'
use of subpoenas to obtain information from lawyers about their clients); authorities cited supra note 23.
82. See D.C. RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 3.8(g) (providing that prosecutor, in presenting
case to grand jury, shall not "intentionally interfere with the independence of the grand jury, preempt a
function of the grand jury, abuse the processes of the grand jury, or fail to bring to the attention of the
grand jury material facts tending substantially to negate the existence of probable cause").
83. See id.
84. See OKLA. RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8(e) (requiring prosecutors to "exercise
reasonable efforts to prevent investigators, law enforcement personnel, employees or other persons
assisting or associated with the prosecutor in a criminal case from making an extrajudicial statement
that the prosecutor would be prohibited from making under R. 3.6").
85. See VA. DIScIPLINARY RULE 8-102A(3) (prohibiting public prosecutor from discouraging any
person from giving relevant information to defendants).
86. The range of possible new ethics provisions is limited only by one's imagination. For example,
state rules of criminal procedure that require prosecutors to open their files to the accused might just as
easily be promulgated as state ethics rules. If applied through the CPA, these rules would afford
defendants far broader discovery than they now receive in federal criminal cases. Similarly, state ethics
regulators could forbid prosecutors to use illegally obtained evidence, on the theory that using such
evidence brings disrespect to the legal profession. Such a provision would have the effect of negating
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Three more general types of ethics provisions, if interpreted broadly by state
authorities, have far greater significance for federal prosecutions than the
explicit prosecutorial standards discussed above. First, several states have adopted
ethics rules that forbid lawyers to compensate fact witnesses for their testimony. 87 A controversial federal appellate decision recently suggested that inducements to testify in plea bargaining might violate a federal bribery statute.8 8
Although the decision has not stood the test of time, 89 a reasonable argument
can be made that plea bargaining inducements do constitute "compensation"
under the state ethics rules. The CPA may provide a stronger basis than the
federal bribery statute for defense attorneys to seek the exclusion of testimony
procured through plea bargains.
Second, according to testimony before Congress, state bar organizations have
recently begun to consider whether general prohibitions against "misrepresentations" by attorneys 9° should be applied to prosecutors. 9' Undercover investigations conducted under a prosecutor's supervision inevitably require
misrepresentations. Likewise, efforts to induce confessions or cooperation by
Fourth Amendment decisions permitting the introduction of illegally obtained evidence where the
wrongdoing was committed by a private party or by law enforcement agents acting in good faith, or
where the wrongdoing violated the rights of someone other than the accused. Indeed, an ethics rule
could go even further and require the disqualification of any prosecutor who has deliberately acquired
illegally obtained evidence. Cf MODEL RuLEs, supra note 22, Rule 1.9 (disqualifying lawyers who
previously had access to confidential information of former client that they might, in theory, misuse).
While it is unlikely that any state court would presently adopt many of the above ethics provisions, it is
important to remember that, even today, state ethics codes include some provisions directed uniquely at
prosecutors. See supra notes 81-85.
87. See, e.g., DEL. RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(b)(ii)-(iii) (1995) (limiting compensation for fact witnesses, but not expert witnesses); ILL. RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCT Rule 3.3(a)(15)
(1998) (lawyers may pay fact witnesses only expenses and reimbursement for lost compensation, but
may pay expert witness a reasonable fee); PA. RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCT Rule 3.4b(1)-(2)
(1998) (limiting fact witness compensation).
88. See United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343, 1348 (1998), rev'd, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir.
1999) (en banc).
89. Singleton was reversed by an en banc panel. Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1297. Several other courts
also have rejected the argument. See, e.g., United States v. Haese, 162 F.3d 359, 366-67 (5th Cir. 1998)
(rejecting Singleton); United States v. Ware, 161 F.3d 414, 421-22 (6th Cir. 1998) (disagreeing with
Singleton and holding that § 201(c)(2) does not apply to government); United States v. White, 27 F
Supp. 2d 646, 648-49 (E.D.N.C. 1998) (rejecting Singleton as aberrational decision); United States v.
Hammer, 25 F. Supp. 2d 518, 535-36 (M.D. Pa. 1998) (disagreeing with Singleton); United States v.
Reid, 19 F. Supp. 2d 534, 535-38 (E.D. Va., 1998) (holding that Singleton would work "obvious
absurdity"); United States v. Arana, 18 F. Supp. 2d 715, 717-19 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (declining to follow
Singleton); United States v. Dunlap, 17 F Supp. 2d 1183, 1184-88 (D. Colo. 1998) (holding that
agreements made with witnesses do not violate government antigratuity statute); United States v.
Guillaume, 13 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1332-34 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (disagreeing with Singleton); United States
v. Eisenhardt, 10 F. Supp. 2d 521, 521-22 (D. Md. 1998); United States v. Barbaro, No. 98 CR. 412,
1998 WL 556152, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 1998) (predicting Singleton would be reversed). But see
United States v. Revis, 22 F Supp. 2d 1242 (N.D. Okla. 1998) (accepting argument); United States v.
Fraguela, No. 96-0339, 1998 WL 560352 (E.D. La. Aug. 27, 1998) (same), vacated on reconsideration,
No. 96-339, 1998 WL 910219 (Oct. 7, 1998).
90. See, e.g., MODEL RuLES, supra note 22, Rules 4.1, 4.3.
91. Legislative Hearings, supra note 34, at 11 (testimony of Seth Waxman, Associate Attorney
General).
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defendants often involve threats that the prosecutors do not intend to carry out
as well as misrepresentations about the facts. If state regulators determine that
such activity constitutes deceit or misrepresentation within the meaning of state
ethics rules, the Citizen Protection Act's incorporation of the state determinations could undermine federal undercover operations and plea bargaining as we
know it.
Third, to the extent that state conflict of interest rules apply fully to federal
prosecutors, practical problems may arise for federal law enforcement. In
particular, prior to the CPA, federal prosecutors' offices were always granted
more leeway than private law offices when an individual lawyer's conflict of
other
interest would, under a strict reading of conflict rules, be imputed to all 92
disqualified.
be
to
office
entire
the
require
thereby
and
lawyers in the office
D. CHANGES IN THE APPLICABILITY OF LOCAL FEDERAL COURT RULES

As we have already noted, the CPA subjects federal prosecutors to state law
and local federal court rules. One way of interpreting this mandate is that state
professional rules apply when the local federal court has not adopted any local
rules.9 3 A somewhat broader interpretation is that the state rules apply only
when the federal court has not adopted any local rules regarding the prosecutorial conduct in question. A more expansive reading, however, would subject
federal prosecutors to state rules even when a federal court has adopted a less
onerous rule, provided the rules are not in direct conflict. In other words, the
CPA arguably imposes on federal prosecutors the most restrictive regulation that
can be found within state and federal law. Such an interpretation, though
peculiar on its face, is consistent with Congressman McDade's distrust of
federal prosecutions.94 Again, the thrust of the legislation may be to limit
federal prosecutorial activity to the maximum effect possible, regardless of its
effect on valid law enforcement goals.
E. CHANGES IN WHO MAY REGULATE FEDERAL PROSECUTORS

Thus far, this article has focused upon the Citizen Protection Act's effects on
the day-to-day operations of prosecutors. The CPA significantly affects what
laws and rules apply to federal prosecutors. Perhaps more importantly, the CPA

92. See, e.g., Blair v. Armontrout, 916 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Gout, 897 F.2d 231
(7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Newman, 534 F. Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). In most jurisdictions, a
private lawyer with a conflict of interest may not be "screened" from participating in the representation. The lawyer's office will be vicariously disqualified. See MODEL RULES, supra note 22, Rule
1.10(a) ("While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when
any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so .. "). Applying this rule equally
to federal prosecutors would mean that an entire U.S. Attorneys' Office would be disqualified when a
single Assistant U.S. Attorney has a conflict. However, ethics rules generally permit a personally
disqualified prosecutor to be screened. See MODEL RULES, supra note 22, Rules 1.10, 1.11 (c).
93. See supra text accompanying note 57.
94. See supra text accompanying note 12.
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opens the door to future regulation-giving states blanket authority to impose
further constraints down the road.
Of equal significance is the effect of the CPA on who can regulate federal
prosecutors. Until now, the primary regulator of federal prosecutors has been
Congress. The Department of Justice has claimed limited authority to regulate
itself.95 It has also given some grudging deference to local federal court rules in
circumscribed areas.9 6 The CPA now delegates primary regulatory authority to
the states. Although Congress continues to recognize the regulatory authority of
the federal courts, it seems to equate or even subordinate that authority to that of
98
the states. 97 The CPA minimizes the Department of Justice's own authority.
Perhaps more interesting is the assumption underlying the CPA that Congress's power to determine who can regulate federal prosecutors is plenary. The
CPA assumes that there is no area of federal prosecutorial activity that states are
inherently powerless to regulate. It also assumes either that the federal executive and judiciary have no independent power to regulate federal prosecutorial
ethics or that Congress has the authority to override that power. Finally, even if
the CPA is correct that Congress has the final say regarding the regulation of
federal prosecutors, the CPA assumes that Congress has the power to delegate
its authority to whatever regulator Congress sees fit.
F. CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE EFFECT OF THE CPA

When simply reading the CPA, it is difficult to determine how much change
in the traditional regulation of federal prosecutors the CPA truly intends to bring
about. At root, the CPA probably was intended simply to limit the prosecutorial
conduct that Congressman McDade found offensive in his own prosecution.
Nevertheless, the CPA's broad and undifferentiated language supports each of
the changes discussed above and with them raises difficult practical, theoretical,
and legal issues.
If the CPA remains in effect for long, there is little doubt that some American
jurisdiction will exercise its newly delegated power and that the Department of
Justice will resist. Both state and federal courts will need to resolve the resulting
legal issues.
Even if the CPA is amended, however, the issues remain important. In
95. See Reno Rule, supra note 25, at 39,911-12 (asserting that Justice Department may preempt
state ethics codes but noting that "its attorneys should adhere to the principles underlying those rules to
the maximum extent possible").
96. The Reno Rule itself acknowledges some judicial power to set rules. See Reno Rule, supra note
25, at 39,916-17 (recognizing courts' rulemaking authority but asserting Justice Department's authority
to preempt particular rules). For the most part, however, the Justice Department has, in recent years,
limited its acquiescence to federal court regulation to circumstances in particular litigation that occur in
a court's presence. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 48 (1992) (suggesting that federal
court's supervisory power over prosecutors may be limited to in-court conduct).
97. See supra text accompanying note 57.
98. In other words, to the extent the Department's view of appropriate conduct conflicts in any way
with that of state law, the CPA requires the Department to follow the state model. See 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 530B(b).
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re-evaluating the statute, Congress must consider both the extent of its own
authority and how far it truly wishes to press that authority. Likewise, the
Justice Department, in adopting regulations, and federal courts, in adopting
rules, must confront the very real conflicts between their purported regulatory
authority and that of the other branches. Thus far, with the limited exception of
the Thornburgh memorandum and the Reno Rule, the various branches have
restrained themselves so as to avoid a confrontation. The issues raised by the
McDade proposal and discussed in this article demonstrate that the potential for
a confrontation may be greater even than the regulators have always assumed.
1II.

THE OVERARCHING SUBSTANTIVE QUESTION-ARE FEDERAL PROSECUTORS

ETHICALLY DISTINCTIVE?

An essential assumption of the CPA is that federal prosecutors should, for
purposes of legal ethics, be treated more like private lawyers and state prosecutors. Because the CPA never underwent the scrutiny of full committee oversight,
this assumption never was tested. Part 1H of this article considers whether there
are reasons to regulate federal prosecutors differently from other lawyers generally or from state prosecutors in particular. Part 1I identifies the possible
justifications without attempting to analyze them fully. These are complex
issues that future regulators of federal prosecutors-including Congress in
re-evaluating the CPA-will need to address.
99
As discussed above, the CPA's scope, in part, is unclear. In subjecting
government attorneys to ethics rules "governing attorneys in each State [where
in that State," 100
they perform their duties] to the same extent as other attorneys
the CPA may eliminate all ethical distinctions between federal prosecutors and
private attorneys. 10 1 Viewed this way, the CPA challenges the conventional
understanding that prosecutors are ethically distinguishable from other lawyers.
Part IliA, however, suggests that in practice most state ethics rules are irrelevant

99. See supra Part I.
100. 28 U.S.C.A. § 530B(a).
101. This interpretation was advocated by the ABA, which asserted in support of the CPA that "[a]ll
lawyers should [continue] to be held to the same standards of ethical conduct." Letter of Robert D.
Evans, Director, ABA Governmental Affairs Office, to ABA conferees (Sept. 17, 1998) (on file with
author); accord Letter of Philip S. Anderson, President, ABA, to members of United States Senate (Feb.
22, 1999) (asserting same in opposition to proposed repeal of CPA) (on file with author); William D.
Delahunt, All-Powerful Prosecutors,WASH. PosT, Mar. 3, 1999, at A23 (opposing repeal of CPA, on
ground that "[i]f the people are to have confidence in the administration of justice, they must know that
federal prosecutors will be held to the same standards of conduct that apply to other attorneys").
The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers argued this principle less successfully in the
context of United States v. Singleton, discussed supra note 89 and accompanying text: "Requiring
prosecutors to abide by the same standards of conduct that all other lawyers are required to meet would
help restore public confidence in the criminal justice system and would constitute a small step toward
restoring some equilibrium in the adversarial process." Brief Amicus Curiae of National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers at 14-15, United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998), quoted
in David A. Sklansky, Starr Singleton, and the Prosecutor'sRole, 26 FoRDHAM UR. L.J. 509, 538
n.138 (1999).
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to prosecutors. Of the rest, many set standards for private lawyers that are too
permissive for prosecutors, while others set standards from which prosecutors
traditionally, and correctly, have been exempt.
Alternatively, Congress simply might have meant to treat federal prosecutors
the same as state prosecutors in the states in which they are licensed.10 2 This
interpretation of the CPA challenges the position of the Department of Justice
that federal criminal prosecutors differ from state prosecutors in ways that
render state ethics regimes ill-suited to their work. Parts ILI.B and III.c explore
the conflicting premises. Part mI.a explains how the rationales for treating both
state and federal prosecutors differently from other lawyers might also explain
why federal prosecutors should be treated differently from state prosecutors.
Part III.c suggests that the federal nature and national character of federal
prosecutors' cases may also provide a basis for making distinctions.
Reading the CPA most narrowly, one can argue that Congress might have
accepted the possibility that federal prosecutors should be regulated less restrictively than state prosecutors, but concluded that the Department of Justice is the
wrong body to make rules reflecting this distinction.1 0 3 In other words, Congress might simply have removed regulatory authority from the Department of
Justice and conveyed its authority, residually, to the states. This raises the
question, explored briefly in Part 111.o, of which government bodies still can
determine whether federal prosecutors are unique, whether federal prosecutors
should be governed by different standards and, if so, what those standards
should be. Part III.D identifies the issues left unresolved by the CPA that future
regulators would need to address.
A. ARE PROSECUTORS DIFFERENT FROM OTHER LAWYERS?

Ethics regulators always have assumed that prosecutors are unique. For the
most part, this assumption is reflected in ethics norms that restrict prosecutors
more than other lawyers. It is questionable whether the CPA intended to
overturn the traditional understanding about prosecutors' heightened ethical
responsibilities. However, prosecutors also typically have been exempted from
a number of ethics prohibitions that apply to private lawyers. Whether the CPA
meant to reject this distinction, and therefore, to regulate federal prosecutors
more strictly than state prosecutors is less clear.

102. See United States v. Ferrara, 847 F. Supp. 964, 968-69 (D.D.C. 1993), affd, 54 E3d 825 (D.C.
Cir. 1995) (effort by Justice Department to exempt its attorney from discipline for violating state rule
applicable to state prosecutors); In re John Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 480 (D.N.M. 1992) (asserting that
"the Government threatens the integrity of our tripartite structure by arguing [that] its lawyers, in the
course of enforcing the laws regulating public conduct, may disregard the laws regulating their own
conduct").
103. See generally Bruce A. Green, Whose Rules of Professional Conduct Should Govern Lawyers
in Federal Court and How Should the Rules be Created?,64 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 460, 486-89 (1996)
(arguing that Department of Justice is less qualified than federal courts because of lack of objectivity).
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1. Prosecutors' Higher Obligations
The CPA's suggestion that ethics rules should apply equally to federal
prosecutors and other lawyers seems odd. Most state ethics rules are irrelevant
to prosecutors' work, because full-time federal prosecutors do not engage in
much of the professional conduct that is regulated by disciplinary rules. Federal
prosecutors are entrusted to make decisions on behalf of the United States, and
t°4
thus do not represent clients in the same way as most private attorneys.
Federal prosecutors do not market their services, do not enter into fee arrangements, and ordinarily do not have dealings with clients per se. Consequently,
provisions on client consultation, advertising, solicitation, and attorneys' fees
are inapplicable to federal prosecutors. Likewise, ethics rules allocating decisionmaking authority do not remotely describe the way prosecutors reach decisions
in federal criminal cases.
Many ethics provisions that do apply to prosecutors in theory, such as those
06
dealing with client confidentiality105 and conflicts of interest,1 are far less
significant for them than for other lawyers. Federal prosecutors are subject to
federal regulations that deal with these subjects more specifically and, by and
large, more restrictively. For example, the confidentiality of government informa-

104. See Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 FORD1HAM URB. L.J. 607,
633-34 (1999).
105. A prosecutor has an ethical duty to preserve the government's confidential information. See
MODEL RULES, supra note 22, Rule 1.6; MODEL CODE, supra note 22, DR 4-101; see also United States
v. Ostrer, 597 F.2d 337, 339-40 (2d Cir. 1979) (former federal prosecutor disqualified from representing
criminal defendant to prevent his use of nonpublic government information); Robinson v. Grievance
Comm., 70 A.D.2d 209 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (former federal prosecutor disbarred for giving
confidential information respecting cases pending in U.S. Attorney's Office to persons believed to be
members of organized crime); Op. N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, No. 606 (Jan.
11, 1990). See generally Robert P. Lawry, Confidences and the Government Lawyer, 57 N.C. L. REv.
625 (1979); Rita M. Glavin, Note, ProsecutorsWho Disclose ProsecutorialInformationfor Literary or
Media Purposes: What About the Duty of Confidentiality?,63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1809 (1995). However,
this duty does not significantly restrain a prosecutor in the investigation and prosecution of criminal
cases because, typically, a prosecutor represents no individual client who can make confidential
disclosures. While the government may be entitled to preserve the confidentiality of information
acquired in its capacity as a prosecutor, a prosecutor has substantial authority to waive confidentiality
on behalf of the government. Cf 5 C.FR. § 2635.703(a) (1999) (government employee "shall not use
inside information obtained as a result of his Government employment for private gain").
106. The duty of loyalty and the duty to avoid conflicting interests apply to prosecutors. See MODEL
RULES, supra note 22, Rule 1.7(b); MODEL CODE, supra note 22, DR 5-101, 5-107(A)(2). But these
obligations have far less significance for full-time federal prosecutors than for private lawyers or state
prosecutors, because they represent only one client. Cf In re Patterson, 176 F.2d 966, 968 (9th Cir.
1949) (disciplining federal prosecutor for his representation of litigant in state proceedings). In contrast,
in state or local jurisdictions in which prosecutors are allowed to engage in private practice while they
function as a government attorney, conflicts of interest may arise. See Gault v. Texas Rural Legal Aid,
Inc., 848 F2d 544, 552 n.24 (5th Cir. 1988) (noting that "there are special ethical considerations which
must be taken into account by public prosecutors who also engage in private representation"); In re
Truder, 17 P.2d 951, 952 (N.M. 1932) (reprimanding district attorney for prosecuting suit for civil
damages on same facts as criminal prosecution in which he was involved). See generally John 0. Kizer,
Legal Ethics and the ProsecutingAttorney, 79 W. VA. L. REv. 367, 371 (1977).
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tion is addressed by federal regulation 0 7 and a rule of procedure.' 0 8 Likewise,
the federal prosecutor's duty of loyalty is addressed both by criminal statutes
that outlaw conflicts of interest' 0 9 and by regulations that require government
lawyers to represent the government in a loyal and disinterested manner."
Because the overwhelming majority of state ethics rules are superfluous, the
CPA's mandate that federal prosecutors should play by the same ethics rules as
other lawyers has considerably less force than at first appears.
The more significant problem with the notion that prosecutors should play on
a level field with other lawyers is that, in many respects, both state and federal
prosecutors have been held to a higher standard than other lawyers. They are
charged with an overarching duty to seek justice-a duty recognized for well
over a century. "' In contrast, the ordinary understanding of the private lawyer's
role in litigation is that the lawyer should do almost everything legally permis1 2
sible to win a case on behalf of a client. '
The prosecutor's unique role has been the justification for disciplinary provisions that are directed exclusively at prosecutors." 3 Over the past three decades, the number of such provisions has increased." 4 Moreover, courts have
107. See, e.g., 5 C.F.R. 2635.703(a) (government employee "shall not use inside information
obtained as a result of his Government employment for private gain").
108. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6.
109. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 201, 205, 208 (1994) (prohibiting government attorneys to receive
bribes and gratuities and to act as lawyer against interests of United States); cf United States v.
Gorman, 807 F.2d 1299 (6th Cir. 1986) (federal prosecutor convicted of having conflict of interest in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 20 1(g)).
110. See, e.g., 5 C.F.R. § 735.204 (1999) (financial conflicts of interest); id. § 735.203 (outside
employment).
11. The duty is said to be premised on prosecutors' extraordinary powers and their unique role as
"the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereign whose obligation to
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done." Berger v. United
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); see also Green, supra note 104, at 612-14, 625-37.
112. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE 7 (1998) ("The core principle of the
Dominant View is this: the lawyer must or at least may pursue any goal of the client through any
arguably legal course of action and assert any nonfrivolous legal claim.").
113. See MODEL RULES, supra note 22, Rule 3.8; MODEL CODE, supra note 22, DR 7-103. The ethics
codes also contain conflict-of-interest provisions that are directed particularly at government attorneys.
See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 22, Rule 1.1 1(c); MODEL CODE, supra note 22, DR 9-101.
114. The ABA Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility, which was adopted (with some variation)
by most states beginning in the early 1970s, included only two-the first requiring "probable cause"
before instituting criminal charges and the second requiring prosecutors to disclose exculpatory and
mitigating evidence. See MODEL CODE, supra note 22, DR 7-103(A)-(B). When the ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct was adopted in 1983, its special rule on prosecutors included several additional
provisions. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 22, Rule 3.8(b) (imposing responsibility on prosecutors
to protect an accused's right to counsel); id. Rule 3.8(c) (forbidding prosecutors from seeking a waiver
of important rights by an unrepresented defendant). Since that time, other provisions have been added,
including a provision restricting the issuance of grand jury subpoenas to lawyers that the Department of
Justice has adamantly opposed and few states have adopted. See id. Rule 3.8(f); see also authorities
cited supra note 81; cf United States v. Colorado Supreme Court, No. 98-1081, 1999 WL 679678, at
*5-6 (10th Cir. 1999) (upholding the rule); Stem v. Supreme Judicial Court for Massachusetts, 184
F.R.D. 10 (D. Me. 1999) (challenging rule).

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 88:207

recognized that, given the different conception of the prosecutor's role, generally applicable disciplinary provisions may be unduly permissive as applied to
prosecutors. For example, prosecutors have a duty, not shared by other lawyers,
5
to prevent or correct judicial and other procedural error." 1 Likewise, prosecuof candor to the tribunal is also greater than that of lawyers
tors' obligation
6
l
generally."
Congressman McDade introduced the CPA to prevent perceived ethical abuses
by federal prosecutors. By subjecting government attorneys to state ethics rules,
he probably did not mean to reduce the conduct of federal prosecutors to the
ethical level of private lawyers. The CPA's general premise that federal prosecutors must play by the same ethical rules as other lawyers is at odds with the
CPA's own goals.
2. Prosecutors' Claim to Exemption from Ethics Restrictions
Although for the most part prosecutors have accepted their higher ethical
responsibilities, they have simultaneously claimed that many ethics restrictions
applicable to other lawyers do not apply, or do not apply in the same way, to
them." 7 With respect to the no-contact rule, this claim has occasioned controversy. With respect to other rules, however, the "uniqueness of prosecutors," in
the sense of their being regulated less restrictively than other lawyers, has been
accepted almost universally by courts. Until recently, the proposition has not

been questioned even by the private bar.
In some respects, this deference to prosecutors is not entirely visible in state
115. Thus, the rules appear to permit lawyers generally, but not prosecutors, to advance "bad" legal
arguments (that is, arguments that they expect will not prevail and believe ought not to prevail), as long
as the arguments are not frivolous. Cf SIMON, supra note 112, at 29 ("Sir, you do not know [an
argument] to be good or bad till the judge determines it.") (quoting JAMES BOSWELL, THE LIFE OF
SAMUEL JOHNSON (1952)). Compare MODEL RULES, supra note 22, Rule 3.1 (allowing good faith
nonfrivolous arguments), with United States v. Eason, 920 F.2d 731 (11 th Cir. 1990) (imposing higher
duty on prosecutors). Similarly, ethics rules do not require private lawyers to call procedural problems
to the court's attention, but prosecutors are expected to do so. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Her Brother's
Keeper: The Prosecutor'sResponsibility When CriminalDefense Counsel Has a Conflict of Interest, 16
AM. J. CRIM. L. 323 (1989) (noting that only prosecutors have been required to alert court when
opposing party's lawyer has conflict of interest).
116. The rules can be interpreted as allowing lawyers to make statements to the court or to introduce
testimony that they only suspect is false or erroneous, but most regulators would insist that it is
ethically (if not constitutionally) improper for a prosecutor to do the same. See, e.g., United States v.
Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 457 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that prosecutors should proceed with great caution
when introducing testimony that they suspect may be false). Similarly, courts have held that a
prosecutor may not ask the jury to draw an inference that the prosecutor knows to be false. See, e.g.,
United States v. Lusterino, 450 F.2d 572, 574-75 (2d Cir. 1971) ("When the prosecution participates in
allowing a false picture to be painted, it bears a heavy burden of showing that it could not have affected
A verdict based on such a deception must be set aside."); United States v. Universita,
the verdict ....
298 F.2d 365, 367 (2d Cir. 1962) (holding that prosecution has special duty not to mislead and that
prosecution should never make affirmative statements contrary to what it knows to be truth).
117. Reno Rule, supra note 25, at 39,911, 39,914 (exempting Department of Justice from state
no-contacts rules, but stating that Department would try to honor spirit of state ethics codes when that is
consistent with its attorneys' law enforcement duties).
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ethics codes, because it takes the form of an absence of rules addressing
conduct that ordinarily would be regulated. The most obvious examples relate
to prosecutorial decisionmaking in investigating and charging, plea bargaining,
taking positions at sentencing, and other discretionary functions. Recognizing
the danger of prosecutorial overreaching, the U.S. Supreme Court has suggested
that even constitutionally permissible prosecutorial conduct might be subject to
ethics regulation."t 8 The ABA has published unenforceable guidelines addressing such conduct." 9 Yet the state ethics codes and the ABA models on which
20
they are based have remained silent on these matters.
In other respects, the ethical distinctiveness of prosecutors is more openly
acknowledged. As discussed below, courts and bar association ethics committees have always exempted prosecutors from ethics restrictions imposed on
private lawyers in (1) conducting criminal investigations, (2) rewarding witnesses for their willingness to testify, and (3) dealing with conflicts of interest.
a. Criminal Investigations. For private lawyers, zealous representation in the
pretrial context typically involves seeking information helpful to a client's cause
12 1
and seeking to determine what information the adverse party has learned.
Ethics rules restrict who lawyers may contact and the methods lawyers may use
to ascertain information. In particular, ethics rules forbid lawyers and their
agents to engage in deceitful conduct, 2 2 give advice to unrepresented persons,123 and engage in ex parte communications with represented parties. 124 On
their face, these rules make no distinctions among lawyers practicing in specific
roles or settings. Nonetheless, courts generally, and federal courts in particular,
have given prosecutors far more leeway than private practitioners in choosing
25
the means by which they gather evidence.'
The no-contact rule has been the controversial example. The CPA is in large
118. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 & n.9 (1978) (discussing overcharging by
prosecutors); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (upholding prosecutors' immunity from suit in
part because of prosecutor's "amenability to professional discipline by an association of his peers").
119. See generally STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNcTION Standards 3-3.1 to 4.3, 3-6.1 (3d ed. 1993).
120. The exception is one inconsequential provision that codifies pre-existing law. MODEL RuLEs,
supra note 22, Rule 3.8(a) (forbidding prosecutor from initiating criminal charges without probable
cause).
121. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 117 (1934) ("[I]t is
the duty of the attorney to learn the facts by every fair means within his reach."); N.Y.S. Bar Ass'n
Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 463 (1997) ("The gathering of information and the marshalling of
evidence are an inseparable part of the lawyer's duty to serve his client with zeal and competence.").
122. See, e.g., MODEL RuLES, supra note 22, Rule 8.4(c); MODEL CODE, supra note 22, DR 1-102(4).
123. See MODEL RuLEs, supra note 22, Rule 4.3; MODEL CODE, supra note 22, DR 7-104(A)(2).
124. See MODEL RuLEs, supra note 22, Rule 4.2; MODEL CODE, supra note 22, DR 7-104(A)(1).
125. Some decisions have, however, applied the same standard to defense lawyers and prosecutors.
See, e.g., Grievance Comm. v. Simels, 48 E3d 640, 647-49 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that ethical rules
apply to both defense lawyers and prosecutors); Ill. State Bar Ass'n, Op. 837 (1983) (criminal defense
lawyer does not violate DR 7-104(A)(1) by contacting individual represented on unrelated criminal
charges because that individual is not "party" and is not represented "in the matter").
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measure designed to counter the Justice Department's efforts to exempt federal
prosecutors from its reach.' 2 6 Yet, the fact remains that the Reno Rule is
consistent with federal court decisions applying and interpreting the no-contact
provisions. The no-contact rule forbids private lawyers to directly contact
people who have retained counsel in a matter, 1 27 but the overwhelming weight
of judicial authority permits prosecutors to direct undercover investigators or
informants to contact represented individuals prior to the initiation of formal
criminal charges. 128
Prosecutors' exemption from other ethics restrictions governing investigations has been taken for granted. For example, despite ethics rules that forbid
lawyers to provide advice to unrepresented third parties with adverse interests, 12 9 prosecutors routinely advise arrested defendants and likely witnesses
that they should cooperate with the government.
Similarly, ethics rules proscribing "conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation'"' 30 apply far more restrictively to civil litigators
than to criminal prosecutors. In the civil context, the rules forbid such deceitful
conduct as the failure to correct a false impression or misunderstanding. 13' Civil

126. See supra text accompanying note 42.
127. See, e.g., W.T. Grant Co. v. Haines, 531 F.2d 671, 674 (2d Cir. 1976) (applying no-contact rule
to persons who have retained counsel in connection with potential civil dispute); Kearns v. Fred
Lavey/Porsche Audi Co., 573 F. Supp. 91, 95-96 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (same); Triple A Machine Shop,
Inc. v. State, 261 Cal. Rptr. 493, 498 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (rule "attached once an attorney knew that an
opposing party was represented by counsel even where no formal action had been filed"); Fla. State
Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 78-4 (1978) (rule applies "whenever an attorney-client
relationship has been established, regardless of whether or not litigation has commenced"); Miss. State
Bar, Op. 141 (1988) ("The actual filing of a lawsuit or intent to file a lawsuit is irrelevant to the
question of whether the lawyer may communicate with the adverse party"); Or. State Bar Ass'n Bd. of
Governors, Op. 1991-42 (1991) (before instituting lawsuit, lawyer for prospective agent may not
contact prospective defendant or have agent do so if prospective defendant is known to be represented);
Tex. State Bar Professional Ethics Comm., Op. 492 (1994) (rule applies "despite the fact that litigation
is neither in progress nor contemplated"); see also R.I. Op. 93-33 (1993) (citing In re Illuzzi, 616 A.2d
233 (Vt. 1992) (applying rule to represented insurers who have interests with respect to litigation but
are not parties)).
128. See, e.g., United States v. Ryans, 903 F.2d 731, 739 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Hammad,
858 F.2d 834, 839 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Fitterer, 710 F.2d 1328, 1333 (8th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Kenny, 645 E2d 1323, 1339 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Weiss, 599 F.2d 730, 739 (5th
Cir. 1979); United States v. Lemonakis, 485 F.2d 941,955-56 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
129. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 22, Rule 4.3; MODEL CODE, supra note 22, DR 7-104(A)(2);
see Attorney Q v. Mississippi State Bar, 587 So.2d 228 (Miss. 1991) (plaintiff's attorney violated rule
by answering "Don't worry about it" in response to unrepresented defendant's question about whether
to contact his insurer).
130. MODEL RuLEs, supra note 22, Rule 8.4(c); MODEL CODE, supra note 22, DR 1-102(4); cf
Richard K. Burke, "Truth in Lawyering ": An Essay on Lying and Deceit in the Practice of Law, 38
ARK. L. REv. 1 (1984) (suggesting that rule is too vague to be effective).
131. See, e.g., In re Milita, 492 A.2d 380 (1985) (disciplining criminal defense lawyer for failing to
correct witness's mistaken impression that lawyer was representing witness); ABA Comm. on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1414 (1978) (extensive undisclosed participation by
lawyer assisting pro se litigant would constitute dishonest conduct); ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1386 (1977) (failure to disclose that client had signed Mary
Carter agreement would violate rule); see also In re Hockett, 303 Or. 150, 159 (1987) (for purposes of
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litigators must ensure that their investigators refrain from misleading witnesses
and adversaries about their identities and who they represent. 32 In contrast,
prosecutors routinely direct law enforcement agents to mislead suspects about
the agents' identities and goals. Criminal investigators often communicate with
suspects in an "undercover" capacity133 and mislead suspects into believing
34
that they are not targets of an investigation. 1
Except with respect to surreptitious tape recording of conversations with
witnesses, the reported decisions have never questioned the use of deceit in
criminal investigations. 35 Even on the taping issue, prosecutors have ignored
DR 1-102(A)(4), "dishonesty can be engaged in actively or passively and has an element of knowledge
that the conduct engaged in is contrary to commonly accepted norms of fair and open dealings with
others").
132. Lawyers are forbidden to violate ethical rules through the acts of another. See, e.g., MODEL
RULES, supra note 22, Rule 8.4(a); MODEL CODE, supra note 22, DR 1-102(A)(2). Compare L.A.
County Bar Ass'n Op. 314 (1970) (lawyer for defendant in personal injury case may not direct
investigator to make undercover contact with the plaintiff to determine his present activities and
physical condition), with Ala. Bar Ass'n Op. RO-89-31 (1989) (lawyer may direct investigator to pose
as buyer for plaintiff's machine in order to determine whether plaintiff can lift machine and must
therefore have lied about extent of his injuries).
133. See, e.g., Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 548 (1992); Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S.
545, 545 (1977); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 424 (1973); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S.
206, 210 (1966); United States v. Manarite, 44 F.3d 1407, 1411 (9th Cir. 1995).
134. See, e.g., Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 403 n.2 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(citing illustrative cases). See generally, Note, Fairness in CriminalInvestigations Under the Federal
False Statement Statute, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 316, 325-26 (1977).
135. An ABA opinion has taken the firm position that secretly recording a witness's conversation is
deceit. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 337 (1974). That
opinion extended the prohibition to prosecutors based on an earlier opinion, decided under the 1908
Canons of Ethics, that had held that prosecutorial use of secretly recorded conversations created an
"appearance of impropriety." Id. (citing ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics
and Grievances, Formal
Op. 150 (1936)). Although the 1974 opinion recognized that "[tihere may be extraordinary circumstances" in which a prosecutor "might ethically make and use secret recordings if acting within strict
limitations conforming to constitutional requirements," this language connoted that, in most situations,
prosecutors, like other lawyers, are ethically forbidden from making surreptitious tape recordings. Id.
Most states addressing the issue of secret recordings have agreed with the ABA approach, but have not
focused specifically on prosecutors. See People v. Smith, 778 P.2d 685 (Colo. 1989); People v. Wallin,
621 P.2d 330 (Colo. 1981); In re Anonymous Member of South Carolina Bar, 404 S.E.2d 513 (S.C.
1991); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Informal Op. C-480 (1961); ABA Comm.
on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Informal Ops. 1008 & 1009 (1967); Ala. Bar Ass'n, Op. 84.22
(1984); Alaska Bar Ass'n, Op. 83-2 (1983); Haw. Formal Op. 30 (1988), reprinted in NAT'L REPORTER
ON LEGAL ETrucs n.3 (1989); Idaho Formal Op. 130 (1989), reprinted in NAT'L REPORTER ON LEGAL
ETHics n.8 (1990); Minn. Informal Ethics Op. 3 (1986), reported in Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct
(ABA/BNA) 901:5025 (1986); N.Y. City Bar, Comm'n. on Professional Ethics, Ops. 683 (1945); 813
(1956); 832 (1957); 836 (1958); cf. Idaho Formal Op. 130 (1989), reprinted in NAT'L REPORTER ON
LEGAL ETHics n.8 (1990) (forbidding secret tape recordings as "conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice"). See generally Abraham Abramovsky, Surreptitious Recording of Witnesses
in Criminal Cases: A Quest for Truth or a Violation of Law and Ethics?, 57 TULANE L. REv. 1 (1982);
Charles W. Adams, Tape Recording Telephone Conversations-Isit Ethicalfor Attorneys?, 15 J. LEGAL
PROF'L 171 (1990); Ellen A. Mercer, Note, The Undisclosed Recording of Conversations by Private
Attorneys, 42 S.C. L. REv. 995 (1991). Some authorities, deferring to conventional practice, have
explicitly authorized prosecutors to make secret tape recordings subject to constitutional and statutory
restrictions. See, e.g., Ohio Supreme Court, Bd. Comm'rs on Grievances and Discipline, Formal Op.
97-3 (1997).
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the suggestion of regulators that it is unethical to secretly record conversations
with witnesses and suspects. 136 In practice, countless reported decisions acknowledge the occurrence of surreptitious recording in criminal investigations without
questioning its propriety.1 37 No disciplinary body has ever sanctioned prosecutors for authorizing undercover officers and informants to gather evidence in
this manner.
b. Compensating Witnesses. Ethics codes restrict lawyers from providing com38
pensation to fact witnesses that may induce the witnesses to testify falsely.'
The rules have been interpreted broadly to forbid offering any inducements
39
other than fair compensation for lost time.1 As a practical matter, however,
prosecutors have been exempt from this prohibition. Prosecutors regularly offer
by the terms of the rules.
witnesses inducements that are specifically prohibited
' 40
questioned.
been
rarely
has
practice
this
Again,
136. Prosecutors have taken the position that legally obtained evidence should not be excluded
because of a perceived violation of ethics rules. See N.Y. City Bar, Comm'n on Professional Ethics, Op.
80-95 (1980) ("No subsequent opinion has considered the ethics of a prosecutor's use of secret
recordings. And not surprisingly, the ABA's Delphic statement has not deterred prosecutors from using
this investigative tool.").
137. See, e.g., United States v. Dijan, 37 F.3d 398 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Schwartz, 924
F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518 (7th Cir. 1985).
138. See, e.g., MODEL CODE, supra note 22, DR 7-109(C) (forbidding lawyer to pay "compensation
to a witness contingent upon the content of his testimony or the outcome of the case," but allowing
reimbursement of expenses and compensation for lost time); MODEL RuLES, supra note 22, Rule 3.4(b)
(prohibiting inducements to witnesses that are "prohibited by law"); Golden Door Jewelry Creations,
Inc. v. Lloyds Underwriters Non-Marine Ass'n, 865 F. Supp. 1516 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (interpreting MODEL
RuLES, supra note 22, Rule 3.4(b) broadly to exclude testimony of witnesses who received payments
permissible under federal law but which court nonetheless deemed unethical).
The principal purpose of rules like DR 7-109(C) is to avoid inducements that serve as "an incentive
to untruthful testimony." Person v. Association of the Bar of New York, 414 F. Supp. 144, 146
(E.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd, 554 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1977); cf MODEL CODE, supra note 22, EC 7-28
("Witnesses should always testify truthfully and should be free from any financial inducements that
might tempt them to do otherwise."). The rules also reflect the concern that it is inappropriate to pay for
testimony that witnesses have a civic duty to provide. See N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional
Ethics, Op. 547 (1982) (quoting 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2202 (1961)).
139. See, e.g., MODEL CODE, supra note 22, DR 7-109(C)(2) (allowing compensation for lost time);
NLRB v. Thermon Heat Tracing Servs., Inc., 143 F.3d 181, 188-91 (1998) (reviewing case law). Thus,
the rule has been read to forbid payments that are contingent on the outcome of the case and
noncontingency payments that are designed solely to secure the individual's presence as a witness. See,
e.g., Cresswell v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 922 F.2d 60, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1990) (sanctioning payment of
separate contingency fees to lawyer who also was witness in case); Committee on Legal Ethics of the
W. Va. State Bar v. Sheatsley, 452 S.E.2d 75 (W. Va. 1994) (sanctioning contingency payment); In re
Shamy, 282 A.2d 401 (N.J. 1971) (sanctioning giving of loan to witness to secure the witness's
testimony); AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBmrrT 370-72 (Maru
ed., 1979) (summarizing rule); cf. Florida Bar v. Jackson, 490 So. 2d 935 (Fla. 1986) (sanctioning
lawyer for requesting that his clients be paid $50,000 for their testimony in pending insurance claim
case). The rule has been held to forbid not only payments, but also promises of potential payment that
are never intended to be kept. See, e.g., Wagner v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, 646 F. Supp. 643, 656-57
(N.D. 111.1986) (affirming disciplinary action against lawyer who induced witness "by the promise of
potential payment to give testimony he otherwise might not have given," despite defense that lawyer
never meant for money to change hands).
140. Courts typically wink at contingent payments to witnesses made with the knowledge of
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c. Conflicts of Interest. Conventional bar association wisdom is that prosecutors and other government lawyers have a greater obligation than other lawyers
to avoid conflicts of interest. Government lawyers may have a special obligation
to "avoid the appearance of impropriety" because of the importance of preserving public trust in the operation of government.' 4 ' Yet, judicial decisions apply
42
conflict of interest rules less restrictively to prosecutors than to other lawyers. 1
4
3
Federal cases, in particular, have refused to apply the ordinary rule. 1

prosecutors. See, e.g., United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 1987) ("[N]o
practice is more ingrained in our criminal justice system than the practice of the government calling a
witness who is an accessory to the crime for which the defendant is charged and having that witness
testify under a plea bargain that promises him a reduced sentence."); id. at 316 (Rubin, J., concurring)
(noting that it would otherwise violate ethical rules for prosecution to pay its witness contingent fee and
that doing so perverts trial process, but that Court's decision in Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293
(1966), appears to authorize the practice); United States v. Beard, 761 F.2d 1477, 1479 (11 th Cir. 1985)
(characterizing payment to witness that included "reward" at conclusion of case as noncontingency
payment); People v. Mills, 237 N.E.2d 697, 705 (I11. 1968) (characterizing prosecutor's payment to
witness as essential). Moreover, courts have given prosecutors the benefit of the doubt as to whether
payments to witnesses are contingent on the success of the prosecution or the content of their testimony.
See, e.g., United States v. Solorio, 53 F.3d 341 (9th Cir. 1995) (reversing earlier decision that paying
informer/witness was based, inter alia, on whether sting operation resulted in conviction, was contingent witness fee). In some cases, the practice of paying witnesses is now specifically permitted by
federal legislation. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, After the Fall: The Criminal Law Enforcement Response
to the S&L Crisis, 59 FoRDHAm L. REV. 155, 181 (1991) (questioning wisdom of this legislative
development).
Similarly, courts permit prosecutors to promise leniency to defendants in exchange for their testimony against others, although this form of "compensation" for testimony may be even more likely
than monetary payments to induce a witness to testify falsely. A particularly effective promise is a
prosecutor's agreement to consider filing a motion asking a witness's sentencing court to depart from
federal sentencing guidelines on the basis that the witness has, in the prosecutor's view, provided
substantial assistance to the prosecution. Without such a motion, the witness has no chance of obtaining
sentence below the guideline minimum. See, e.g., United States v. Agu, 949 F2d 63, 67 (2d Cir. 1991)
(holding that prosecutor has exclusive authority to decide whether to file motion and trigger court's
ability to depart from the guidelines); United States v. Huerta, 878 F.2d 89, 93-94 (2d Cir. 1990)
(same); see also authorities cited supra note 89 (stating that courts considered whether prosecutorial
promises of leniency violated federal bribery statutes but ignored question of whether such promises
violated state ethical rules). But see United States v. Lowery, 15 F Supp.2d 1348, 1358 (S.D. Fla. 1998)
(holding that prosecutor's offer of leniency to witness violated Florida's ethical rule as well as federal
bribery statute), rev'd, 166 F.3d 1119 (11th Cir. 1999).
141. See generally Bruce A. Green, Conflicts of Interest in Legal Representation: Should the
Appearance of Impropriety Rule Be Eliminated in New Jersey-Or Revived Everywhere Else?, 28
SETON HALL L. REv. 315 (1997).
142. See supra text accompanying note 92; see also State v. Camacho, 406 S.E.2d 868, 873-74
(N.C. 1991) (holding that district attorney could be disqualified only for actual, not potential, conflict of interest); State v. Fitzpatrick, 464 So. 2d 1185, 1188 (Fla. 1985) (overturning disqualification of whole state's attorney's office where one prosecutor had previously had confidential
relationship with defendant); Morganthau v. Krane, 113 A.D.2d 20, 22 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (holding that county district attorney's office was not disqualified from prosecuting defendant simply
because defendant's first cousin was assistant district attorney); State v. Jones, 429 A.2d 936, 942-43
(Conn. 1980) (declining to impute disqualification of single state prosecutor to entire prosecutor's
office).
143. See, e.g., United States v. Caggiano, 660 F.2d 184, 190-91 (6th Cir. 1981) (no imputed
disqualification where defendant's former lawyer was screened from participation).
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3. Questions Raised by the CPA Regarding Prosecutors' Distinctiveness
We have suggested that state and federal prosecutors have always been
treated as distinct, sometimes being held to a higher ethical standard and other
times to a lower one. The CPA raises the question of whether or not prosecutors
should continue to be regulated differently from other lawyers, and if so, how.
There are three possible answers, and it is unclear which one the CPA adopts.
First, one might interpret the CPA as authorizing only stricter and not more
permissive ethics standards for federal prosecutors than for nonprosecuting
attorneys. This would subject the prosecutors to generally applicable rules
concerning investigations, witness compensation, and conflicts of interest. This
interpretation of the CPA would encourage states to re-examine their ethics
rules. States could permit or forbid the distinctive conduct that federal prosecutors have traditionally pursued, but states could not make distinctions in applying the rules between the prosecutors and private lawyers.'44
Second, one could interpret the CPA as eliminating all distinctions between
federal prosecutors and other lawyers, including the traditionally heightened
ethical responsibilities of prosecutors. This would mean, for example, that
disciplinary rules could not impose more onerous disclosure obligations on
federal prosecutors or address areas of professional conduct, such as the issuance of grand jury subpoenas or the decision to initiate criminal charges, that
relate distinctively to their work. 1 4 5 The Department of Justice would remain
free to adopt additional restrictions and to enforce them internally. Courts could
issue opinions containing precatory language or admonitions about prosecutors'
duty to do justice. But ethics regulators could not adopt enforceable higher
standards of conduct.
Finally, one might interpret the CPA as allowing regulators other than the
Justice Department to continue adopting and enforcing standards of conduct
distinguishing prosecutors from other lawyers, but requiring federal prosecutors
to be treated like state prosecutors. This would be consistent with the traditional
approach-that the higher standard for prosecutors should, to some extent, be
enforceable in the disciplinary context and that the standards applicable to other
lawyers sometimes are ill-suited to prosecutors.
One interpretation the CPA does not seem to countenance is that federal
144. Several states have used such reciprocal reasoning to allow private lawyers, like prosecutors, to
secretly tape record witnesses. See, e.g., Ariz. State Bar Op. 90-2 (1990); Ky. Bar Ass'n Op. E-279
(1984); N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n Op. 696 (1993); cf. Attorney M v. Mississippi State Bar, 621 So.
2d 220, 221 (Miss. 1992) (recording witness secretly is not by itself unethical but use of tape may be);
Or. State Bar, Legal Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 1999-156 (1999) (in absence of substantive legal
restriction, lawyer generally may secretly tape record conversation); Utah State Bar, Ethics Advisory
Op. Comm., Formal Op. 1999-156 (1999) (with respect to whether attorney may record communications surreptitiously, "[wie believe there is no reason to make a distinction between prosecuting
attorneys and attorneys in other areas of practice").
145. This is essentially the approach taken by the ABA Model Rules with respect to government
lawyers in civil practice. See ABA Standing Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op.
94-387 (1994).
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prosecutors should be considered unique unto themselves. The CPA leaves open
the possibility that regulators other than the Justice Department-including
Congress-may implement special rules for the federal prosecution corps. That
possibility is discussed in Part II.c of this article. However, the thrust of the
CPA is to set aside any vision of prosecutors as special. The following section
considers reasons why that judgment may be ill-conceived.
B. ARE FEDERAL PROSECUTORS DIFFERENT FROM STATE PROSECUTORS?

This article has illustrated some of the ways in which all prosecutors have
been regulated less strictly than private lawyers. Broadly speaking, the differential treatment has been justified on four different grounds: (1) the nature and
context of prosecutors' work, (2) prosecutors' independent duty to "seek justice," (3) respect for the professional traditions governing prosecuting attorneys,
and (4) prosecutors' status as government officials. The following sections
consider whether these rationales can be extended to justify further distinctions,
not only between prosecutors and private lawyers, but also between federal and
state prosecutors.
1. The Distinctiveness of Federal Law Enforcement
Prosecutors' enforcement of criminal law is meaningfully different from other
types of litigation. Criminal process differs from civil process. 146 The constitutional law that informs prosecutors' legal work is distinctive. 147 The public
arguably has a greater interest in the accomplishment of legitimate law enforcement objectives than in the just resolution of private civil disputes.
The differences between criminal and civil processes, for example, helps
explain why the no-contact rule has been applied less strictly to prosecutors
than to civil lawyers conducting an investigation.148 In a civil case, a client's
interest in receiving information from another represented person can be pur146. For example, in order to obtain evidence in a criminal case, the government may:
on behalf of the grand jury ... compel the production of evidence and the attendance of
witnesses at ex parte grand jury proceedings; ... apply for search warrants, arrest warrants
and authorization to conduct wiretaps; ... grant individuals immunity from prosecution; ...
[and] seek an order compelling witnesses to testify before the grand jury or at a criminal trial
in exchange for a promise that their testimony will not be used against them.... These
powers afforded the government are ordinarily denied to all others within sociary and are
generally denied even to the State in other legal settings.
N.Y State Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 683 (1996).
147. For example, prosecutors and police are subject to constitutional restrictions on questioning
individuals who are in custody or who have been indicted, whereas private citizens are not subject to
such restrictions. See, e.g., Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520 (1987) (requirements of Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), do not apply when wife of prisoner questions her husband with police
present); United States v. Watson, 894 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Sixth Amendment restrictions on
police questioning of indicted defendant do not apply to jailhouse informant acting on his own
initiative).
148. See generally Bruce A. Green, A Prosecutor'sCommunications With Represented Suspects and
Defendants: What Are the Limits?, 24 CRIM. L. BULL. 283, 317-20 (1988).
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sued through formal discovery. It therefore is not considered sufficiently important to outweigh the interests protected by the no-contact rule. In the criminal
context, the balance arguably tilts the other way because there is a greater
public interest in full disclosure of all relevant information, there is limited
149
and it is generally
discovery from criminal defendants once charges are filed,
in civil proceedthan
criminal
in
information
truthful
obtain
to
more difficult
criminal dejurisdictions
some
in
(and
ings. Therefore, criminal prosecutors
50 are given greater latitude than civil practitioners to
fense lawyers as well)'
gather evidence informally.
Similarly, the distinctive nature of criminal law helps explain why prosecutors have greater discretion than other lawyers to employ deceit in the course of
an investigation.1 51 Secret tape recordings are no less deceitful in the criminal
than in the civil context. But they are permitted because of the paramount need
52
and because
for "the efficient detection and proof of criminal conduct"'
investigacriminal
regulating
specifically
constitutional and statutory provisions 53
1
deceit.
of
use
the
tions do not proscribe

149. Even before charges are filed, the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination may be
invoked to impede access to testimony and documents through the grand jury process. See, e.g., United
States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 622 (1984) (upholding invocation of privilege in response to grand jury
subpoenas for business documents and records of several sole proprietorships).
150. See, e.g., Grievance Comm. v. Simels, 48 F.3d 640 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that no-contact rule
does not forbid criminal defendant's lawyer from communicating directly with represented individual
who is potential witness and potential codefendant).
151. See supra note 135.
152. N.Y. City Bar, Comm'n on Professional Ethics, Op. 80-95 (1980).
153. That the distinction between prosecutors and private lawyers is at least partly attributable to the
context of their work is borne out by the willingness of ethics regulators to allow private lawyers to
employ deceit in the same manner as prosecutors when their work is fairly analogous to criminal
law enforcement-for example, when the work implicates comparably important interests or entails
comparable impediments to the discovery of important evidence. See, e.g., Apple Corps Ltd. v.
International Collections Soc'y, 15 F. Supp. 2d 456, 474-75 (D.N.J. 1998) (allowing civil lawyers to
make misrepresentations to uncover evidence of violations of court order); see also Richardson v.
Howard, 712 F.2d 319, 321-22 (7th Cir. 1983) (authorizing use of "testers" in housing discrimination
cases); Hamilton v. Miller, 477 F.2d 908, 909 n.1 (10th Cir. 1973) (same); Ala. Bar Ass'n, Op.
RO-89-31 (1989) (opining that lawyer may direct investigator to pose as customer in order to
determine whether plaintiff lied about his injuries), available in Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/
BNA) 901:1052-53 (1989). But see Christopher J. Shine, Note, Deception and Lawyers: Away from a
Dogmatic Principle and Toward a Moral Understanding of Deception, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 722,
738 (1989) (arguing that prosecutors should be held to less exacting standard than private lawyers).
See generally David B. Isbell & Lucantonio N. Salvi, Ethical Responsibility of Lawyersfor Deception
by Undercover Investigators and Discrimination Testers: An Analysis of the Provisions Prohibiting Misrepresentation Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
791, 805-07 (1995) ("There is no solid basis for a generalized ethical distinction between government and private lawyers [involved in discrimination cases], exempting the former from applicable
restrictions simply by reason of the identity of their employer or client."); Michael J. Yelnosky, Filling an Enforcement Void: Using Testers to Uncover and Remedy Discrimination in Hiring for
Lower-Skilled, Entry-level Jobs, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFOPuM 403 (1993) (discussing the ethical distinctions); Alex Young K. Oh, Note, Using Employment Testers to Detect Discrimination:An Ethical and
Legal Analysis, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 473 (1993) (approving use of employment discrimination
testers).
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In proposing legislation to replace the CPA, 154 Senator Hatch implicitly relied
on the distinctive nature of federal criminal law enforcement to support a
provision distinguishing federal prosecutors. 155 Hatch took the position that
even if state courts might reasonably apply their rules in certain ways to state
prosecutors-for example, to forbid prosecutors from communicating directly
with corporate employees or to require prosecutors to present exculpatory
evidence to the grand jury 156 -they
should not necessarily apply these rules
57
equally to federal prosecutors.
Hatch relied upon a perceived distinction between the nature of the conduct
that state and federal criminal laws cover. Federal prosecutors are more likely
than state prosecutors to enforce laws governing complex, ongoing, conspiratorial conduct, such as "multistate terrorism, drug, fraud, or organized crime
conspiracies, ... fraud against federally financed programs, ... [violations of]
5 8
civil rights laws,.. . complex corporate crime, and ... environmental crime."

A related distinction involves the context and mechanics of federal prosecutions. Federal prosecutors are more likely to investigate across state lines. They
also are likely to be involved personally in the investigation leading to an
indictment and to employ the grand jury for investigative purposes. State
prosecutors, in the typical case, rarely become responsible for a case until the
police have made an arrest and the evidence is ready to be presented to the
grand jury.
Consider how these distinctions might justify different ethics regimes for
federal and state prosecutors. For example, do differences in federal and state
grand jury practices warrant requiring state prosecutors to introduce exculpatory
evidence, while not imposing the same requirement on federal prosecutors? In
federal grand jury investigations, massive amounts of evidence, much of it
documentary, may be accumulated. It may be difficult for prosecutors to recognize the exculpatory nature of an item of evidence. Where there are massive
amounts of inculpatory evidence, there may be less need to call an exculpatory
item to the grand jury's attention. To the extent federal cases truly tend to be
more complex than state cases,1 59 there thus may be grounds for applying

different ethical standards to the prosecutors involved.
154. S. 250, 106th Cong. (1999).
155. See id. § 530B(b) and accompanying remarks, quoted supra note 10. The provision offers an
exception to a separate provision stating that "a Federal prosecutor shall be subject to all laws and rules
governing ethical conduct of attorneys of the State in which the Federal prosecutor is licensed as an
attorney." Id. § 530B(a). On one level, Hatch's proposal may have stemmed from concern that state
courts might be persuaded by "clever defense lawyers" to adopt rules that are bad for both state and
federal prosecutors-such as a rule forbidding prosecutors from giving leniency to cooperating
witnesses. 145 CONG. REc. S705 (1999) (testimony of Sen. Hatch). Congress, however, can do little to
prevent such a result in the state courts.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. Id.
159. This premise, of course, is subject to dispute. Many state prosecutions are complex and involve
massive investigations as well.
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Similarly, suppose that a state court interprets its ethics rules to restrict state
prosecutors from offering inducements to accomplice witnesses in exchange for
their testimony, based on the court's conclusion that this practice sometimes
encourages false testimony. Such a restriction may be reasonable for the state's
prosecutors, while being inappropriate for federal prosecutors. The complexities
of federal criminal cases and the difficulty in securing evidence in such cases
may give federal prosecutors a greater need to obtain evidence through the use
of inducements.
2. The Distinctiveness of Federal Prosecutors' Commitment to Higher Ethical
Standards
One counterintuitive justification for regulating all prosecutors less restrictively than other lawyers is that prosecutors have "a duty to do justice." This
standard, because of its rigor, may justify exempting prosecutors from prophylactic ethics rules generally applicable to lawyers. Thus, for example, prosecutors'
greater obligation to ensure that the testimony they offer is truthful may mean
that prosecutors are less likely to reward witnesses improperly for agreeing to
testify.' 6 ° As a consequence, the rules limiting lawyers' ability to offer such
arguably should be different for prosecutors than for private
inducements
61
attorneys.1
One cannot make the claim that federal prosecutors have a greater "duty to
seek justice" than state and local prosecutors. But it may be that federal
prosecutors, and the offices in which they work, take the duty more seriously
than state prosecutors as a whole. 1 62 A variety of evidence suggests that, as a
general rule, the Department of Justice takes its duty to serve justice to heart.
Unlike most state and local prosecutors' offices, the Justice Department continu160. See Sklansky, supra note 101, at 517 (arguing that prosecutors should be permitted to offer
leniency to witnesses, even though it is ethically impermissible for private lawyers to offer their
witnesses comparable inducements).
161. This reasoning also helps explain the less restrictive application of conflict of interest rules to
prosecutors. Conflict of interest rules are rules of "risk avoidance," which restrict lawyers from
undertaking representation when their independent judgment is likely to be impaired or they are
otherwise likely to fail in their obligations to a client. See generally Bruce A. Green, Conflicts of
Interest in Litigation: The Judicial Role, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 71, 71-72 (1996); Kevin McMunigle,
Rethinking Attorney Conflict of Interest Doctrine, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 823, 826 (1992) (discussing
risk avoidance theory). Because prosecutors' objectives are to do justice, not merely to win, prosecutors
may be less tempted to overlook their duties to multiple clients. For example, a prosecutor who has
been screened from participating in a case because she formerly represented the accused may be less
likely to improperly divulge confidences to other prosecutors participating in the case. Likewise, the
other prosecutors might be less likely to request disclosure of the confidences than would private
lawyers in comparable situations. This is precisely the reason given by a 1975 ABA ethics opinion for
treating prosecutors' offices less restrictively than private law offices under the vicarious disqualification rule. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 342 (1975) ("The
salaried government employee does not have the financial interest ... inherent in private practice....
The channeling of advocacy toward a just result lessens the temptation to circumvent the disciplinary
rules through the actions of associates .... ").
162. Of course, one cannot fairly apply these generalizations to particular state prosecutors or
prosecution offices.

2000]

THE UNIQUENESS OF FEDERAL PROSECUTORS

ally has developed published guidelines that reflect its understanding of prosecutors' duty to seek justice. 163 It has established formal training programs through
which its ethical understandings are transmitted. 64 In recent years, the Department has required United States Attorneys' Offices to appoint ethics officers to
address ethical issues. 165 It has established the Office of Professional Responsi66
bility specifically for the purpose of internal regulation. 1
The disparity between the Justice Department's ethics oversight and that of
most local district attorneys' offices may justify a different level of external
regulation. State ethics codes must take into account state prosecutors who work
part-time and serve in offices where there are few career prosecutors, little
history or ethical tradition to guide prosecutors, and minimal written guidelines,
training, supervision, or formal self-regulation. The resulting rules may be
67
unduly restrictive when applied to federal prosecutors. 1
The CPA seems to reject this reasoning. The CPA was largely motivated by
its sponsor's personal experience with perceived misconduct by federal prosecutors. 168 Congressman McDade personally would never have agreed with the
empirical claim that federal prosecutors are, on average, more professional than
their state counterparts. In assuming away the argument, however, Congress
rejected the traditional perception of federal prosecutors without any assessment
of the facts.
3. The Distinctiveness of Federal Prosecutors' Professional Traditions
One can explain many rules that distinguish prosecutors from other lawyers
simply on the basis of a respect for traditional understandings of how prosecutors act. 169 Yet, as a justification for distinctions in ethics rules, this explanation
163. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL Vol. 7, Tit. 9
(1987). See generally Bruce A. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many Regulators
Produce Too Little Enforcement?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 69 (1995) (discussing Department of Justice
internal guidelines).
164. See 10 Laws. Man. On Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 312 (1994).
165. See id.
166. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.39a(a) (1999). See generally Green, supra note 163, at 84-87 (discussing
work of Office of Professional Responsibility).
167. This reality helps explain why federal courts are less likely than state courts to disqualify an
entire prosecutors' office when an individual prosecutor has a conflict of interest. See supra note 92.
168. See supra note 12.
169. See 145 CONG. REC. S705 (1999) (testimony of Sen. Hatch) (characterizing state ethics rules
requiring the disclosure of exculpatory evidence as inappropriate when applied to federal prosecutors
because "contrary to long-established federal grand jury practice," and the possibility that witnesscompensation rules might proscribe "the long accepted ... federal practice of moving for sentence
reductions for co-conspirators who... testify[] truthfully for the government").
Respect for tradition is another explanation for why prosecutors, but not other lawyers, may reward
witnesses for their testimony. The restriction on compensating witnesses derives from common-law
decisions predating the Code of Professional Responsibility. See, e.g., Dodge v. Stiles, 26 Conn. 463,
467 (1857); Burchell v. Ledford, 10 S.W.2d 622, 622-23 (Ky. 1928); Keown & McEvoy, Inc. v. Verlin,
149 N.E. 115, 116 (Mass. 1925); State ex rel. Spillman v. First Bank of Nickerson, 207 N.W. 674, 676
(Neb. 1926); Clifford v. Hughes, 124 N.Y.S. 478, 479 (N.Y. App. Div. 1910); Ealy v. Shelter Ice Cream
Co., 150 S.E. 539, 540-41 (W. Va. 1929); Thatcher v. Darr, 199 P.2d 938, 940 (Wyo. 1921). See
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is tautological. It is hard to make a logical case for extending this rationale-to
argue that federal prosecutors should be treated distinctively simply because
they have been so treated in the past.
Even if one wished to rely on the professional traditions of federal prosecutors, before accepting separate ethical standards one would have to ask the
factual question of whether identifiable federal prosecutorial traditions actually
exist. One should at least consider the normative question of why federal
prosecutors should be permitted to continue traditional federal practices that
state ethics rules reject (either because state prosecutors have no history of
following the practice or because the state has discarded the tradition). The
CPA, in any event, seems to foreclose making such a distinction between state
distinction on their
and federal prosecutors unless states choose to make the
170
law.
state
overruling
of
capable
are
own or federal courts
4. The Distinctiveness of Federal Prosecutors' Status as Members of the
Executive Branch
In part, prosecutors have always been regulated differently from other law17 Courts
yers because they represent the executive branch of government.
hesitate to supervise prosecutorial conduct for fear of encroaching on the
authority of another branch. Courts sometimes perceive that a prosecutor's
office has superior expertise with respect to questions concerning the propriety
of certain conduct or, at least, that the172judgments of prosecutors deserve greater
weight than those of private lawyers.
generally 6 ARTHuR L. CORBIN, CORBN ON CONTRACrS § 1430, at 379 (1962) (witness compensation is
"almost certain to affect the attitude of the witness and to color his testimony, consciously or
unconsciously. This is true even though there is no perjury and no intention to induce perjury."); HENRY
S. DRInKER, LEGAL ETmcs 75 (1953) ("A lawyer may not participate in a bargain with a witness as a
condition of his giving evidence .. "). Prosecutors also had a long history of offering criminals
leniency in exchange for their testimony. See United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1301 (10th Cir.
1999) (discussing tradition).
170. See supra text accompanying note 93.
171. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETmcs 30 (1986) (suggesting that, on one reading
of separation of powers principles, it might be argued that as "members of the executive branch of
government. . . the conduct of prosecutors may be regulated solely by the executive branch and not by
the judiciary").
172. These considerations explain the absence of ethics rules and the dearth of disciplinary decisions
relating to prosecutors' discretionary decisions about whom to investigate and charge. Even aside from
constitutional concerns about whether they have authority to regulate these areas of conduct, courts
defer to prosecutors' views concerning the standards that should govern these areas of conduct because
this conduct is entrusted to the executive branch. See Harvard Law Review Association, Race and the
Prosecutor's ChargingDecision, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1520, 1522 (1988) (separation of powers considerations foreclose "significant judicial review of [a prosecutor's] constitutionally delineated power to
decide independently which crimes and what charges to file"); cf. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S.
456, 463 (1996) (exhibiting deference to policymaking authority of federal prosecutors); Wayte v.
United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (limiting judicial intervention into alleged selective enforcement decisions by federal prosecutors). These policy decisions differ from decisions made by prosecutors
as trial lawyers, which are more similar to decisions private lawyers make for private clients. Courts
have more institutional interest and more expertise in regulating the latter type of decisionmaking.
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This article will not catalogue the many examples in which judicial or bar
deference to state prosecutorial agencies helps explain the development of state
ethics rules,' 73 but instead continues to focus on the federal-state distinction.
Because state and federal prosecutors have comparable status as executive
officials, there appears to be no obvious reason to treat federal prosecutors more
permissively. On closer examination, however, two justifications for drawing a
federal-state distinction exist-one based on the distinctive character of the
federal executive branch and the other, discussed in Part III.c, based on the
truism that federal prosecutors must perform their duties in a federal context.
Even if individual state and federal prosecutors are similar in their executive
status, their offices arguably are not. State prosecutors' offices typically are
fragmented. There are statewide and local prosecutors, each with separate
policymaking authority. Statewide Attorney General's Offices typically oversee
only limited aspects of state prosecutions. Thus, particular state prosecutors
cannot speak individually or collectively on behalf of the entire executive
branch.
The Department of Justice, in contrast, represents the law enforcement
authority for the entire federal executive branch. Its positions are authoritative.
When the Department of Justice takes a considered institutional position on a
question of prosecutorial ethics, as on other criminal justice questions, courts
may owe it somewhat more deference than they would accord a similar assertion by a local prosecutor's office.
We do not necessarily endorse this position. For our purposes, it is enough to
note that the CPA seems to reject it without any consideration of its merits.
Nonetheless, it seems questionable that Congress truly would wish states to
ignore the policy assessments of the Department of Justice, including its
173. For example, except with respect to cases of constitutional dimension, ethics regulators
typically avoid setting rules that encroach on the discretion of prosecutors' offices to conduct investigations. Only when the prosecution's methods of gathering evidence implicate the integrity of the judicial
process itself-for example, when prosecutors use a false subpoena or introduce false evidence-do
courts and regulators become less deferential. See, e.g., United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 841
(2d Cir. 1988) (criticizing use of sham subpoena); In re Friedman, 392 N.E.2d 1333 (I11. 1979)
(overturning discipline of prosecutor for deceiving court as part of sting operation); In re Malone, 480
N.Y.S.2d 603 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (censuring prosecutor for instructing police officers to testify
falsely), affd, 482 N.E.2d 565 (N.Y. 1985).
Deference notions also help explain why courts are reluctant to disqualify prosecutors and their
offices, even though conventional wisdom is that prosecutors should be held to a higher standard than
private lawyers. It is one thing to exhort government lawyers to avoid appearances of impropriety; it is
another thing, through the exercise of supervisory authority over the conduct of licensed attorneys, to
remove duly appointed (or elected) government officials from office. See, e.g., Schumer v. Holtzman,
454 N.E.2d 522, 526 (N.Y. 1983) ("A court may intervene to disqualify an attorney only under limited
circumstances.... [A] District Attorney ... is a constitutional officer chosen by the electorate ...
whose removal by a court implicates separation of powers considerations."); State v. Camacho, 406
S.E.2d 868 (N.C. 1991) ("any order tending to infringe upon the constitutional powers and duties of an
elected District Attorney must be drawn as narrowly as possible"); cf. ABA Comm. on Professional
Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 199 (1940) (recognizing that prosecutors' status as government
officials required applying restrictions on pretrial publicity less strictly so as to accommodate their
institutional obligation to communicate with the public concerning their office's work).
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judgments regarding ethics norms. It is one thing to say that state courts can
regulate individual federal prosecutors whom they license, but quite another
thing to say that state courts have "ethics" authority over an entire federal
executive agency.
C. ARE FEDERAL PROSECUTORS DIFFERENT FROM
ORDINARY LITIGATORS IN STATE COURTS?

There are two aspects of the federal status of federal prosecutors that bear on
whether they should be regulated distinctively. The first militates in favor of the
CPA's position that more regulation of federal prosecutors may be appropriate.
But the other provides a strong practical argument for producing regulation
through more centralized regulatory bodies than individual states.
Federal prosecutors appear exclusively as' litigators in federal court. There,
they are subject to local federal court rules. The federal courts, however, tread
lightly in establishing ethics standards, mindful of their limited rulemaking
authority 174 and recent Supreme Court warnings that their supervisory authority
over federal prosecutors may be limited to in-court conduct. 175 The alternative
federal regulator, Congress has, until the CPA, never seen fit to involve itself in
regulating legal ethics generally, let alone federal prosecutorial ethics. 1 76 In
entering the field will
part, this hesitation may stem from Congress's fear 17that
7
authority.
of
realm
courts'
federal
the
encroach upon
These observations have several ramifications. Litigators in state court ordinarily are subject to two sets of nonlegislative regulation: ethics rules and
judicial supervision. The coexistence of this parallel oversight itself suggests
that judicial and bar regulation serve different purposes and complement each
other. To the extent that federal prosecutors are subject to only one set of
independent rules-those established by cautious federal courts-a piece of the
regulatory puzzle may be missing.
The CPA would supply the missing piece by applying state ethics rules. But
this approach magnifies a separate problem that stems from federal prosecutors'
status as federal litigators. Unlike state prosecutors, federal prosecutors have

national jurisdiction and, as a consequence, their cases often stretch across state
lines. As a result, if state ethics standards apply, individual prosecutors may be
subject to standards in multiple jurisdictions in a single case-for example,
174. See infra note 200.
175. See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 48 (1992); Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States,
487 U.S. 250, 264 (Scalia, J., concurring) (1988); United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983).
176. See generally Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEx. L. REv. 335 (1994)
(suggesting that Congress might federalize legal ethics). Those commentators who have addressed the
legal issues typically have done so in the context of discussing which regulator is best able to
administer regulations governing prosecutorial ethics. See generally Green, supra note 163 (arguing
against diffusion of regulation of federal prosecutorial ethics); Zacharias, supra note 7 (discussing pros
and cons of various regulators of federal prosecutorial ethics).
177. See infra text accompanying note 194 (discussing potential conflicts between Congress and
federal courts).
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varying state no-contact rules.'7 8 Moreover, different prosecutors working on a
single case may, because they are licensed in different jurisdictions, be subject
to different rules. This greatly complicates the Department of Justice's ability to
provide general oversight of federal law enforcement. 79 Individual federal
prosecutors inevitably will find it difficult to internalize and keep abreast of the
rules that apply in all the different states.' 80
The status of federal prosecutors as federal litigators, therefore, may justify
distinguishing them from state prosecutors. Where that conclusion leads is
another matter, for all it suggests is that subjecting federal prosecutors to
nonuniform state rules is problematic. It does not establish, as a substantive
matter, that federal prosecutors should be able to avoid the underlying substan1 81
tive restrictions that the state rules embody.
D. CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

A number of reasons have been suggested to explain why one might treat
federal prosecutors as unique for purposes of ethics regulation. This issue is
essential to any congressional reassessment of the CPA and to any future
regulation of prosecutorial ethics. More immediately, however, the CPA leaves
open the question of which regulatory body should decide whether to distinguish federal prosecutors from private lawyers or state prosecutors. The CPA

178. See, e.g., Reno Rule, supra note 25, at 39,911 (discussing practical problems caused by
nonuniform rules); Proposed Rules Governing Communications With Represented Persons, 57 Fed.
Reg. 54,737, 54,738 (1992) (justifying Reno Rule as means of resolving "uncertainty and confusion
arising from variety of interpretations of state and local Federal court rules" by "impos[ing] a
comprehensive, clear, and uniform set of regulations on conduct of government attorneys"); Jamie S.
Gorelick & Geoffrey M. Klineberg, Justice Department Contacts with Represented Persons: A Sensible
Solution, 78 JUDICATURE 136, 142-43 (1994).

179. To make the distinction more concrete, consider the following: A state prosecutor will be
subject to the restriction on compensating witnesses for testimony in every case. In federal prosecutions, however, the rule will not invariably apply because of the disuniformity of state rules. This
complicates training and supervision of federal prosecutors. In individual cases, it may be unclear
whether or not the rule applies, because prosecutors licensed in different states may be working
together, some subject to the particular state rule, others not.
180. See 145 CONG. REC. S705 (1999) (testimony of Sen. Hatch) (arguing that federal prosecutors,
like all other litigants, "have the right to know what the rules are").
181. In the debate over the Reno Rule, the Justice Department did not claim that federal and state
law enforcement differ, perhaps because it hesitated to draw attention to Rule's departure from state
interpretations of the no-contact rule. Although the Reno Rule expressly rejected restrictive state
interpretations, the Department sought to depict it as a mere codification of judicial authorities. See
Proposed Rules Governing Communications With Represented Persons, 57 Fed. Reg. 54,737, 54,738-39
(1992) (arguing that Justice Department position follows traditional interpretations of DR 7-104).
Compare 28 C.F.R. § 77.6(e) (1998) (allowing federal prosecutors to speak with indicted defendants
about crimes other than ones for which they have been charged), with People v. Sharp, 150 Cal.App.3d
13, 15 (1983) (holding that state no-contact rule bars communications about uncharged offenses), and
In re Burrows, 629 P.2d 820 (Or. 1981) (en banc) (same); compare also 28 C.FR. § 77.6(c)(1)-(2)
(allowing prosecutors to respond to indicted defendant's overtures), with State v. Suarez, 481 So. 2d
1201, 1205 (Fla. 1985) (making no exception to no-contact rule for situation in which defendant
initiates conversation), and People v. Green, 274 N.W.2d 448, 452-53 (Mich. 1979) (same).
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82
clearly authorizes states to make at least some of these distinctions.' It may
leave that authority to federal courts as well.' 83 Congress retains the authority to
adopt further legislation on the subject. 184 The only regulatory body the CPA
85
clearly disqualifies is the Department of Justice itself.'
On the assumption that the Justice Department will not easily give up its
claim to distinct treatment, we can expect it to press its demands before one or
more of the other regulatory bodies. But, as our discussion suggests, simply
noting the conceptualizations of federal prosecutors that the CPA discarded
without analysis only opens the debate. The unresolved substantive questions
are complex. They include the following: Should federal prosecutors be required to play by precisely the same rules as private lawyers in some or all
respects? Should regulators accept the CPA's mandate that federal prosecutors
should never be held to a lower standard? Alternatively, should federal prosecutors be held to precisely the same standards as state prosecutors, insofar as these
may be either more or less demanding than the standards applied to lawyers in
general? Or, With respect to particular areas of professional conduct, is there
sometimes a convincing reason for regulating federal prosecutors somewhat
differently from their state counterparts?
Because of the events leading to the Reno Rule, the question of how to

182. It is not clear whether, after the CPA, states may choose to show greater deference to federal
prosecutors than to state prosecutors. Given their acknowledged expertise in the area of legal ethics,
one would think that states would be well qualified to draw ethical distinctions between federal and
state prosecutors. Federal ethics regulation has always depended on the states. Federal courts do not
have separate bar examinations or character investigations; they assure the qualification of applicants
principally by requiring them to be members of a state bar. Most local federal district courts follow the
ethics provisions of the states where they are located, adopting alternative or interstitial rules only on an
ad hoc basis. Only states have professional staffs to enforce ethics violations. Federal ethics regulators
depend on state disciplinary agencies to sanction misconduct in federal proceedings and rely on
state-court determinations to justify suspending or disbarring lawyers from practice in federal court.
Thus, one could fairly argue that states have the most expertise in deciding issues relevant to whether
state and federal prosecutors should be treated the same.
183. As discussed earlier, the CPA's requirement that federal government lawyers comply with
"state laws and rules, and local Federal court rules, governing attorneys" may mean that federal courts
can only add to federal prosecutors' burdens. See supra text accompanying note 93. However, one
might have expected Congress to be more explicit if its intent was to reduce federal courts' general
authority to establish standards of conduct for lawyers engaged in federal criminal prosecutions.
Nothing in the genesis of the CPA indicates skepticism about federal courts' competence to decide that
federal prosecutors should be allowed to engage in particular conduct; the CPA's mistrust was directed
at the Department of Justice, not the federal courts.
184. The CPA must be read against the background of other federal legislation governing criminal
investigations and prosecutions, some of which authorizes federal investigators and prosecutors to
engage in particular conduct-for example, to conduct wiretaps with judicial authorization-and
thereby forecloses application of state ethics rules that might forbid that conduct. Congress clearly may
draw ethical distinctions between federal and state prosecutors by passing future legislation authorizing
federal prosecutors to engage in state-proscribed conduct.
185. Even this is not entirely clear. The Justice Department probably can impose additional restraints
on federal prosecutors based on distinctions between federal and state prosecutors. The CPA, however,
does reflect Congress's determination that the Department may not exempt itself from state ethical
restrictions based on such distinctions.
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regulate the professional conduct of federal prosecutors has become one the
most hotly debated issues in federal criminal procedure during the past decadedrawing in the Department of Justice, Congress, the Judicial Conference of the
United States, the Conference of State Chief Judges, and the organized bar,
among others. When these institutions have addressed the merits, they typically
have relied upon glib generalities about the traditional regulatory authority of
the states, on the one hand, and about the importance of relevant federal
interests, on the other. The previous pages have sought to encourage a more
thoughtful evaluation of what the substantive content of federal prosecutorial
ethics should be.
IV. THE

OVERARCHING JURISDICTIONAL QUESTION-WHO MAY REGULATE?

Quite apart from the merits of regulating federal prosecutors, the CPA raises
several basic issues relating to the authority of the potential regulators. First,
what lawmaking body or bodies have the power to implement regulation of
federal prosecutors? Second, what happens when multiple regulators adopt
conflicting rules? Third, what is the power of Congress to adjust the authority of
the different regulators?
Some aspects of the first question are simple. Unless preempted-and in the
absence of a statute like the CPA-states have some power to regulate lawyers
who practice, or are licensed to practice, within their jurisdictions, including
federal prosecutors. 186 Congress, as the creator of federal agencies, has some
authority to curtail the activities of those agencies, including the Department of
Justice. 187 Federal courts may regulate federal prosecutors pursuant to their
authority to regulate the admission of federal attorneys 188 and the activities of
federal attorneys in the midst of litigation. 89 The Justice Department wields the

186. There is some dispute as to whether states can regulate federal attorneys as federal attorneys.
The original cases protecting federal officials from state interference are unclear with respect to whether
states are precluded from regulating because they have no authority to regulate or because Congress
implicitly has preempted all state law that interferes with federal functions. See, e.g., Boske v.
Commingore, 177 U.S. 459 (1900) (rejecting state court's attempt to require federal Internal Revenue
officials to provide tax records); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819), discussed infra text
accompanying notes 224-28. Nevertheless, states do have the general authority to regulate all attorneys
who practice within their boundaries (including prosecutors), absent some supervening federal law or
policy. The CPA can be characterized simply as a congressional statement of policy that there is no
supervening federal policy to preempt state law or as a statute that authorizes states to regulate federal
prosecutors specifically.
187. See 28 U.S.C. § 501 (1994) (establishing Department of Justice as an executive agency).
188. See, e.g., Samuel J. Brakel & Wallace D. Loh, Regulating the Multistate Practice of Law, 50
WASH. L. REV. 699, 719 n.62 (1966) (discussing federal district court examination and competency
requirements); Malcolm Richard Wilkey, Proposalfor a United States Bar, 58 A.B.A. J. 355, 356
(1972) (arguing against system of federal bar admissions that reflect local conditions); Hugh Williamson, A Curious Checkerboard: Disparate Rules of Admission in Federal Courts, 42 AM. BAR. J. 720
(1956) (describing confusing melange of district court admission standards); Fred C. Zacharias, supra
note 176, at 403-06 (discussing standards for admission to practice before federal district courts).
189. See infra note 204.
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general power of the executive branch. It has the right to make rules for its own
employees.' 90
As these four potential regulators increase their involvement in regulating
specifics, the contours of their authority become less clear. They risk adopting
regulation that exceeds their authority. When one regulator's regulation conflicts
with another's, the question of whose view controls must be resolved.
Because states, to date, have not pressed their authority to regulate federal
prosecutors and federal courts have acted fairly deferentially to both Congress
and the Department of Justice, the limits of the four regulators' respective
powers have not been tested. The CPA flexes Congress's muscles, purporting to
remove all but interstitial regulatory authority from the Executive. At the same
time, the CPA invites states to exert their authority to the hilt. Thus, the
ambiguity concerning the legal authority of the various regulators may soon be
tested.
This ambiguity, rather than the merits of the no-contact with represented
persons issue, is the true legacy of the Reno Rule and the CPA. Most of the
recent scholarship addressing the Reno Rule has focused on the policy question
of whether the rule is wise. 91 Commentators have glossed over the legal issues
within the policy question, often without acknowledging
that are subsumed
192
their complexity.

190. For the most part, this authority stems from general provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act and from the Attorney General's statutory authority to supervise federal litigation and to make rules
governing "the conduct of its employees." 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1994) (authorizing agency heads to
"prescribe regulations for the government of [the] department, the conduct of [its] employees, ... and
performance of its business"); 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1994) (Administrative Procedure Act provision
authorizing agencies to promulgate rules); 28 U.S.C. § 519 (1994) (authorizing Attorney General to
"supervise all litigation ... [and] direct all United States Attorneys [and] Assistant United States
Attorneys"). As discussed in the text accompanying note 208, however, the executive branch's power
to execute the laws may carry with it some inherent constitutional authority to make rules that are
important to carrying out the agency's functions.
191. See supra notes 21, 29, 176.
192. Rory Little, for example, has suggested the existence of limits on federal courts' inherent and
supervisory authority to regulate prosecutors, without delineating those limits. See Little, supra note 21,
at 406-10 (arguing for limitations on federal courts ability to regulate federal prosecutors through local
rules); see also Sarah Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional
and Statutory Limits on the Authority of Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1433, 1464-86 (1984)
(discussing limitations on ability of federal courts to adopt supervisory rules); Cramton & Udell, supra
note 21, at 384-86 (discussing "troublesome questions" regarding the extent of federal courts'
supervisory authority over federal prosecutors). Other commentators have suggested limits on Congress's power to restrict the Justice Department's autonomy. Cf Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B.
Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Law, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 663 (1994) ("Since the
President's grant of 'the executive Power' is exclusive, Congress may not create other entities
independent of the President and let them exercise his 'executive Power.' ").
The authors of this article are guilty of the converse. One has assumed a largely plenary power to
regulate on the part of Congress. See Zacharias, supra note 7, at 454 (assuming that Congress could
determine what ethics rules apply to federal prosecutors). See generally Zacharias, supra note 176
(arguing that Congress has power to preempt field of legal ethics regulation). The other has assumed
similar authority on the part of the federal judiciary. See Green, supra note 103, at 460 (urging federal
courts to "develop a single set of highly detailed rules").
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In an effort to focus the debate, the following pages highlight the core legal
and constitutional issues, without attempting to resolve them. On the surface,
the CPA seems simple. It removes the authority of the Justice Department to
preempt state law. On the theory that the Department's preemptive power is
derived from a Congressional delegation, Congress should be able to limit or
cancel the delegation. 93 Congress, in short, appears to have the power to do
whatever it wants in this regard.
The matter becomes more complicated as soon as one examines the statute
carefully. Depending on how one reads the CPA, it may raise three different
kinds of jurisdictional issues. Congress's mandate may conflict with the authority of the other federal branches. It may exceed Congress's own substantive or
preemptive powers. And the CPA may unconstitutionally delegate authority that
Congress in theory could have exercised on its own. Each of these issues is
discussed in turn.
A. CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND OTHER FEDERAL BRANCHES

194

1. The Conflict Between Congress and the Courts
There are two ways of interpreting the CPA with respect to who can regulate
federal prosecutors. First, the CPA may subject federal prosecutors exclusively
to state law. 195 Second, and more likely, it may subject federal prosecutors to
both state and federal law. Federal law may stem from other congressional acts
or federal court rules and decisions.
Suppose that a federal court adopts local rules' 96 that conflict with state
ethics standards in a way that grants federal prosecutors more discretion than
193. See, e.g., Zacharias, supra note 7, at 432 (describing Department of Justice's preemptive power
as deriving from Congress); see also Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 511 (1992)
(discussing delegated preemption authority); English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79
(1990) (listing acts of Congress that explicitly define extent of preemption); Jones v. Rath Packing Co.,
430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) ("We start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the state
were not to be superceded by the federal act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.").
194. This article discusses only conflicts between Congress and the other federal branches because
those are the only separation of powers issues the CPA raises. Others have addressed the potential
separation of powers issues that might arise, in the absence of controlling legislation, when federal
court rules conflict with regulations promulgated by the executive branch. See, e.g., authorities cited
supra notes 21, 30.
195. More accurately, it might subject federal prosecutors to state law and federal court rules, but not
other federal law. In effect, the CPA could be read as overruling both of the Justice Department's
positions in the Thornburgh Memo, while abdicating other federal regulatory responsibility. As discussed in the text, this reading of the CPA, while plausible, is somewhat strained.
196. Local federal courts have adopted a wide range of ethics rules. The spectrum of local rules is
catalogued in STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, JR., REGULATION OF LAwYERs: STATUTES AND

STANDARDS 591-95 (1992 ed.). Some courts simply adopt the ethics standards of the states in which
they are located, others adopt one or more of the three American Bar Association model codes (i.e., the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1983), the Model Code of Professional Responsibility (1969),
and the Canons of Ethics (1908)), and yet others have adopted no rules or idiosyncratic provisions.
See id.
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the state standards would allow. 1 9 7 When federal standards conflict with state
99
standards, presumably the Supremacy Clause"19 accords them preeminence.
Here, however, the federal court rule arguably conflicts not only with state
standards, but also with Congress's mandate that federal prosecutors be subject
to state standards. To complicate the issue further, at least part of the federal
judiciary's2 °°power to adopt local rules derives from congressionally conferred
authority.
One can interpret the text of the CPA as avoiding any conflict between
Congress and the federal judiciary. The CPA arguably acknowledges federal
20
court rules and allows them to preempt state standards. '
On the other hand, one can read the CPA as giving state standards preference
over federal court rules. On this view, a direct conflict between Congress and
197. For example, suppose a state adopts the original version of MODEL RULES, supra note 22, Rule
3.8(f), which required a prosecutor to avoid subpoenaing attorneys to testify when possible and to seek
judicial approval of a subpoena before issuing one. See Zacharias, supra note 23 (discussing Rule
3.8(f)). Suppose then that the local federal court declined to adopt any version of Rule 3.8(f)-leaving
attorney subpoenas to prosecutorial discretion-or adopted the less onerous provisions of the new Rule
3.8(f).
198. The Supremacy Clause supports federal legislation and the federal Constitution, so at first blush
it does not appear to accord preeminence to judicial standards. However, because the judicial authority
to make standards must derive either from a congressional grant of authority or directly from inherent
authority derived from Article III of the Constitution, the Supremacy Clause should apply.
199. The CPA arguably puts state law and federal district court rules on an equal plane. See 28
U.S.C.A. § 530B(a). However, courts probably would interpret the CPA so as to comport with
Supremacy Clause doctrine. See, e.g., Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 236 (1984)
(holding that courts should interpret legislation in such manner as to "render unnecessary a federal
constitutional question").
There is some question as to whether federal court rules are superior to state law in situations where
state law applies. In diversity cases, substantive federal law has preemptive power, but federal
procedural law only trumps state law when there is a sufficient federal interest in the procedure. See
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958) (declining to follow state law in order to
preserve "the judge-jury relationship in the federal courts"); see also Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking
"Substantive Rights" (In the Rules Enabling Act) More Seriously, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 47, 65,
72-73 (1998) (discussing federal courts' rulemaking authority). Some local practice rules that implicate
legal ethics are essential to the federal courts' ability to operate-such as rules that require lawyers to
abide by the court's orders-while others may have less federal content.
200. The power of the federal courts to promulgate local practice rules derives from at least four
sources. First, Rule 83 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes federal district courts to
promulgate local rules so long as those rules are consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
FED. R. Civ. P. 83 (1998). Second, Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure also authorizes
local practice rules. FED. R. CIuM. P. 57 (1998). Third, the federal Rules Enabling Act confers on the
U.S. Supreme Court the power to make rules for the federal courts, which includes the authorization of
local rules. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994). Fourth, there is some-yet undefined-inherent authority of
federal courts to prescribe rules independently of congressional delegation. See Chambers v. Nasco, 501
U.S. 32 (1991) (recognizing some inherent power of federal courts but declining to define that power or
identify extent to which Congress may limit it); Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton, 481 U.S. 787,
800-01 (1987) (recognizing federal courts' inherent authority to punish contempt). See generally Beale,
supra note 192, at 1474 (discussing power of federal courts to adopt procedural and substantive rules);
Zacharias, supra note 7, at 442-43 and authorities cited at 443 n.58 (discussing inherent power of
federal courts).
201. The CPA expressly subjects federal prosecutors to "State laws and rules, and local federal
court rules." 28 U.S.C.A. § 530B(a) (emphasis added).
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the federal courts arises and gives rise to a separation of powers issue.2 °2 In
other words, to what extent may Congress control the federal judiciary's
authority to regulate prosecutors and to preempt inconsistent state law? Insofar
as the judicial authority derives exclusively from Congress, Congress should be
able to limit it. 20 3 Yet the courts may also have some independent authority to
regulate lawyers with which the CPA arguably interferes. 2°
There is a third plausible interpretation of the CPA. The CPA may subject
federal prosecutors to the more onerous of the state and federal standards.20 5
Even this more modest limitation on the federal judiciary's authoritypreventing it from reducing the burdens on federal prosecutors in federal
court-raises the separation of powers issue, though to a lesser extent. But
assuming that this hurdle can be overcome, the limitation raises the specter of
yet another intrabranch dispute-a dispute between Congress and the Executive. Is it possible that the CPA, thus interpreted, exceeds Congress's power to
regulate executive activities?
202. See, e.g., Mashburn, supra note 21, at 500, 502, 525-26 (questioning Congress's authority to
interfere with federal courts' exercise of their inherent authority); Linda S. Mullenix, Unconstitutional
Rulemaking: The Civil Justice Reform Act and Separation of Powers, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1283, 1322
(1992) (arguing that Congress has limited control over courts' inherent rulemaking power); cf. Flaksa v.
Little River Marine Constr. Co., 389 F.2d 885, 887 (5th Cir. 1968) (suggesting that courts' inherent
power over orderly administration of justice goes beyond that which Congress confers).
203. See FED. R. CIv. P. 83(a)(1) ("Each district court acting by a majority of its district judges, may,
after giving appropriate notice and opportunity for comment, make and amend rules governing its
practice. A local rule shall be consistent with ...Acts of Congress .... ); cf.Raymond C. Caballero, Is
There an Over-Exercise of Local Rulemaking Powers by the United States District Courts?, 24 FED. B.
NEWS 325 (1977) (questioning local rulemaking).
204. See supra note 200. Federal courts have some inherent authority to regulate proceedings before
them. Congress could not, for example, prevent federal courts from holding federal prosecutors in
contempt, because to do so would undermine judges' ability to carry out the judicial function. See, e.g.,
Chambers v. Nasco, 501 U.S. 32, 55 (1991) (upholding courts' inherent power to impose sanctions for
bad-faith conduct); Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 667-68 (1957) (finding inherent judicial
power to judicial proceedings); Berger v. Cuyahoga County Bar Ass'n, 983 F.2d 718, 724 (6th Cir.
1993) ("Federal courts have the inherent authority to discipline attorneys practicing before them and to
set standards for their conduct); United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d, 664, 667 (1st Cir. 1987) (en banc)
(holding that federal courts have inherent and statutory authority to prescribe local ethics rules); Iacono
Structural Eng'g, Inc. v. Humphrey, 722 F.2d 435, 439 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding inherent authority of
courts to issue gag orders to participants in litigation); see also authorities cited in Delker, supra note
21, at 885-88 (discussing supervisory authority of federal courts over attorneys); Kelleher, supra note
199, at 65; Edwin J. Wesely, The Civil Justice Reform Act; The Rules Enabling Act; The Amended
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; CJRA Plans; Rule 83-What Trumps What?, 154 F.R.D. 563, 567
(1994) ("Congress could not through its rulemaking power so hamstring the federal courts so as to
deprive them of carrying out their constitutional functions."); Zacharias, supra note 7, at 440-41
(discussing federal courts' authority). There is some reason to suspect that the Supreme Court might
limit lower courts' inherent authority over federal prosecutors to in-court proceedings, but that has yet
to be determined. Cf. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 46-47 (1992) (acknowledging courts'
supervisory power to establish standards for at least in-court prosecutorial conduct, but questioning
further authority to regulate lawyers).
205. See supra text accompanying note 94 (discussing this option); see also Joan C. Rogers,
Congress Enacts Statute that Subjects FederalProsecutorsto State Laws and Rules, 14 Law. Man. on
Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 498, 500 (1998) (reporting suggestion by law professor that this option will
effectively be the way federal prosecutors will implement law).
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2. The Conflict Between Congress and the Executive
Congress is the creator of federal agencies. Congress has great power to
define the powers of those agencies. 20 6 Yet there are limits on Congress's ability
to intervene in the day-to-day activities of federal agencies,20 7 because the
agencies exercise the Executive's constitutional authority to implement the
law. 20 8 In the law enforcement context, for example, Congress could not order
the cessation of a particular prosecution 2 01 or order the indictment of a particular defendant.2 10 It might, on the other hand, achieve the same results through
less specific legislation.2 l ' Where does Congressional power over the Depart-

206. See Little, supra note 21, at 378-92 (describing congressional establishment of Department of
Justice); see
constitutional
are necessary
JUSTICE: THE

also Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825) (holding that Congress's
authority to establish federal courts gives Congress auxiliary authority to make rules that
and proper to help courts function). See generally CORNELL W. CLAYTON, THE POLITICS OF
ATrORNEY GENERAL AND THE MAKING OF LEGAL POLICY 15-35 (1992) (describing early

history of Department of Justice); Susan L. Bloch, The Early Role of the Attorney General in our
ConstitutionalScheme: In the Beginning There Was Pragmatism,1989 DUKE L.J. 561 (describing early
history of Attorney General).
207. Once Congress enacts a law, its legislative function ends. Congress may influence implementation of the law only by adopting new legislation for the future. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722
(1986) (striking down executive reporting requirements on ground that Congress should not participate
in execution of laws). Overly specific legislative orders to the executive arguably partake less of
legislation and more of implementation of the laws. See id. at 732-33; cf Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S.
654, 694 (1988) (upholding Independent Counsel Act because Congress "retained for itself no powers
of control or supervision over an independent counsel").
208. See, e.g., Note, The Conflict Between Executive Privilege and Congressional Oversight: The
Gorsuch Controversy, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1333, 1349-50 n.105 (1983) (discussing United States v. House
of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150, 153 (D.D.C. 1983), in which executive branch refused to
prosecute case that federal statute required to be enforced).
209. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) ("Executive Branch has exclusive
authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case."). Despite the dictum of the
Nixon case, this precise issue has never been tested in practice nor been decided in litigation. The
analogous issue has, however, been decided in the judicial context. Congress has plenary power to
control the jurisdiction of federal courts. See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868)
(holding that Congress, through general legislation, may withdraw jurisdiction of federal courts to
proceed with a case subjudice). However, when Congress exercises that power in an attempt to control
judicial decisionmaking in a particular case, the court will strike the CPA action down as an unwarranted interference with the judicial function. See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211,
225 (1995) (striking down congressional attempt to change final judgment by courts); United States v.
Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 146 (1872) (refusing to give effect to laws that "prescribe rules of decision to the
Judicial Department of the government in cases pending before it"); Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530,
567-68 (1962) (reaffirming Klein). Likewise, the courts have disclaimed any authority to interfere with
federal attorneys' discretion to "execute the laws" in making enforcement decisions. See, e.g., Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 761 (1984) (holding enforcement decisions to be province of the executive, not
the judiciary). One would logically expect the Court to protect specific exercises of the executive
function from congressional interference in the same way. Cf Pillsbury Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n,
354 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1966) (negating attempt by congressional oversight committee to influence
adjudicatory proceeding before FTC on grounds that Congress was intervening in the agency's
nonlegislative functions).
210. Attempts by federal courts to require the initiation of prosecutions have been found to violate
separation of powers notions. See, e.g., United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965). The
same reasoning should apply with respect to Congress.
211. Congress undoubtedly could change the underlying law for which a defendant is being
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ment of Justice end and where does the agency's independent authority be2 12
gin?
The Justice Department's independent authority, if it exists, may simply
derive from the executive branch's general constitutional authority to execute
the laws 2 13 or "take care" that they be "faithfully executed., 2 1 4 Some types of
Justice Department decisions might be viewed as more executive than others. 2 15
Alternatively, one might be able to craft some legal theory under which the
tripartite structure of our government gives the Executive, in general, and the
Department of Justice, in particular, a limited sphere of "inherent authority"
216
over law enforcement that is free from Congressional or judicial control.

prosecuted in a way that eliminates the illegality of defendant's actions and may even be able to do
so retroactively. See, e.g., Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 438-41 (1992) (upholding Congress's authority to change legal standards that affect outcome of pending cases, even if intent
of change was to influence those cases). But see Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 225
(1995) (limiting Congress's authority to undo final judgments). Congress also can influence the
Department of Justice's ability to prosecute particular cases by adjusting its resources. Cf Daniel C.
Richman, FederalCriminal Law, CongressionalDelegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L.
REv. 757, 793-810 (1999) (discussing indirect congressional controls of federal law enforcement). The
ability to control Justice Department actions, therefore, may depend on the form of Congress's effort to
exert control.
212. It is theoretically possible that the "executive branch would most likely resist the overbroad
assertion of congressional power to prescribe the conduct of executive officers," but it is unclear from
where the executive authority to resist would derive. An analogous issue arose in City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), involving an attempt by Congress to overrule a substantive constitutional
decision by the Supreme Court under the rubric of Congress's power to enforce section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See id. The Court held that Congress's power under section 5 is limited to
remedial authority and that Congress's effort to craft substantive constitutional law intruded on the
Court's judicial power. See id. at 519. With the CPA, Congress arguably interferes, at least potentially,
with the Department of Justice's ability to carry out its executive functions in a similar way. Cf. Loving
v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996) (holding that one federal branch may not impair performance of the constitutional functions of a separate branch).
213. See Gerald V. Bradley, Law Enforcement and the Separation of Powers, 30 ARIz. L. REV. 801,
803, 855-85 (1988) (outlining argument that President "enjoys a broad, constitutionally grounded
discretion over how the law is enforced").
214. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. It is important to note that the U.S. Supreme Court has long rejected the
proposition that the power to execute the law gives the President blanket authority to control all
administrative functions free of congressional oversight. See Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37
U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 611 (1838). The critical questions are when Congress begins to intrude on the
Executive's ability to function, and when the Executive begins to assume or interfere with Congress's
ability to establish the law.
215. For example, a prosecutor's decision of whether to institute or terminate a prosecution may be
viewed as implementing a policy decision that is peculiarly execuive in nature, while the decision of
whether to engage in typical lawyerly activities such as cross-examination may be viewed more subject
to regulation by Congress or the courts. See, e.g., Cox, 342 F.2d at 171 (holding that prosecutor's
exercise of discretion not to indict is peculiarly executive function).
216. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726, 727 (1986) ("structure of the Constitution does not
permit Congress to execute the laws" or extend indirect congressional "control over execution of the
laws"); cf 4B Op. Off. Legal Counsel 756 (1980) (asserting plenary authority of the Attorney General
to compromise disputes against the United States"); 38 Op. Att'y Gen. 98, 102 (1934) (asserting broad
independence of the Attorney General); Bradley, supra note 213, at 804 (cataloguing arguments in
favor of inherent executive authority, but concluding that no such authority exists). It is difficult to see
where the Executive's independent authority might derive from, if not the constitutional provisions
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Defining those theories is beyond this article's scope. The goal of this part is

simply to point out that the issue of Congress's plenary power is more complicated than it appears at first glance. The complication stems in part from
ambiguities in what the CPA itself is mandating and in part from ambiguities in

the background law governing the rulemaking (or "lawmaking") authority of
both federal courts and executive agencies.21 7 In the past, the courts and
executive agencies have dodged the constitutional issues that these ambiguities
raise by avoiding direct conflicts with Congress. The CPA, in subordinating (or
appearing to subordinate) the other branches, has challenged them either to
assert their authority or to abandon all authority in the field.
B. FEDERAL-STATE CONFLICTS

2 18

Thus far, this article has focused on the potential conflicts among the three
federal branches. It now considers the second jurisdictional complication raised
by the CPA's mandate-namely, the relative authority of the state and federal
governments to set rules for attorneys. To what extent may the federal government preempt state authority, and who within the federal government has the
power to take that step?
Until now, most scholars have assumed that Congress's power to preempt
state rules is plenary and that, when Justice Department regulations displace
state rules, they do so because Congress has implicitly delegated preemption
authority to the Department. 1 9 It has been suggested, independently of the
preemption issues, that the Department has inherent authority to make federal
220
That novel theory has
rules that are not subject to congressional oversight.
221
The theory, however,
yet to be vetted, and we do not adopt it as our own.
relating to "execution" of the laws. General structural arguments concerning executive power seem
ill-supported when they cannot be grounded in constitutional text.
217. As Rory Little suggests, there is some ambiguity in the source and extent of the federal courts'
rulemaking authority. See Little, supra note 21, at 405-09. Congress has authorized federal courts to
create local rules, but has defined the subject matter for those rules as "rules for the conduct of [the
courts'] business." 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (1994). In addition, there are other potential sources of
rulemaking authority, including the Rules Enabling Act, the Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal
Procedure, and the courts' inherent authority. See supra note 200. Little argues that recent case law
limiting the courts' "supervisory authority" over federal lawyers to in-court conduct provides a
standard that should be applied to the courts' rulemaking authority as well. Little, supra note 21, at
405-09.
218. Because the CPA supports state regulation, this article does not address whether there are
aspects of the regulation of lawyers that are within exclusive state authority and therefore immune from
federal preemption.
219. See, e.g., Little, supra note 21, at 378 ("mhe only question is whether Congress may, and has,
authorized the Attorney General to act preemptively in the area of lawyer ethics rules."); Zacharias,
supra note 7, at 432 & n.16 ("To the extent an agency has pre-emptive authority, that authority derives
from Congress.").
220. But cf Bradley, supra note 213, at 882 (rejecting the argument for any "inherent" executive
authority over prosecutions).
221. As Gerald Bradley discusses at length, the case law does provide some support for a theory of
executive power over prosecutions. See authorities cited in Bradley, supra note 213, at 883-85. Bradley
suggests, however, that the precedents overgeneralize and, ultimately, are wrong. See id. at 884.
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suggests another possibility-namely, that the Department's preemptive authority does not derive directly from Congress, but rather reflects a separate
executive preemptive power.
An old line of precedent, dating to the times of Chief Justice Marshall,
suggests that some federal institutions are constitutionally protected from state
regulation. In Wayman v. Southard,2 22 Chief Justice Marshall held that states
had no authority to regulate federal court proceedings, even in the absence of
federal legislation preempting state regulation. 223 He applied similar reasoning
in no less of a case than McCulloch v. Maryland.22 4 There, the State of
Maryland attempted to impose a tax on the Second National Bank of the United
States.225 Declaring that the "power to tax involves, necessarily, a power to
destroy,", 226 Marshall struck down the tax without considering whether Congress would have objected.227 The federal agency itself, apparently, was entitled
to protect itself from certain kinds of state regulation whether or not Congress
228
authorized it to do so.
Of course, one can read Wayman and McCulloch consistently with the
principle of congressional control over preemption. Congress arguably implicitly authorizes every federal agency to preempt state rules that threaten their
existence. On the other hand, one can also interpret the cases as recognizing a
sphere of preemptive authority-or, more accurately, immunity from state
regulation-that the Constitution itself accords federal instrumentalities (including the Executive).2 29
This immunity can be conceptualized in two separate ways. Wayman and
McCulloch may mean that states have no residual authority to regulate federal

222. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat) 1 (1825).
223. See id. at 47-48. In Wayman, Congress had incorporated pre-existing state law with respect to
the form and execution of writs applicable in local federal courts. When confronted with the assertion
that Congress had decided to defer to future state rules, Chief Justice Marshall concluded that the states
had no independent ability to regulate state courts and that Congress could therefore not defer to state
decisionmaking on the issue. See id. at 48.
224. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 328-30 (1819).
225. See id. at 326.
226. Id. at 327.

227. See id. at 330.
228. Justice Marshall's vision was carried forward in subsequent cases protecting federal agents
from complying with or being affected by state regulation. See, e.g., Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51,
56 (1920) (reversing conviction of federal postal employee for failing to comply with state drivers'
license regulations); Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U.S. 276, 283 (1899) (holding federal administrator not
subject to the jurisdiction of the State for activities conducted within scope of his duties); cf.Hancock v.
Train, 426 U.S. 167, 178-79 (1976); Leslie Miller, Inc. v. Arkansas, 352 U.S. 187, 190 (1956)
(immunizing federally selected contractor from state licensing requirements); Reno Rule, supra note
25, at 39,917 ("under the intergovernmental immunity doctrine, states may not directly regulate or
punish federal officials for acts undertaken in their official capacities, or otherwise substantially
interfere with the lawful functions of federal officials").
229. Wayman's theory is that state legislators and state courts represent only the state citizens and
therefore cannot affect federal instrumentalities that are designed to benefit citizens of the whole union.
See Wayman, 23 U.S. at 47-48.

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 88:207

instrumentalities because such instrumentalities did not exist at the time the
Constitution was adopted. Thus, one could argue that the power to regulate
these instrumentalities could not have been "reserved" by the Tenth Amendment.230 Alternatively, Wayman would support an interpretation that the independent authority of a federal branch of government (in Wayman, the judiciary)
gives that branch power to withstand, or preempt, state law. 23 '
In a recent article, Professor Michael Ramsey spells out a similar argument in
the foreign affairs realm.23 2 He analyzes the claim that states may adopt laws
affecting other countries and that these laws can coexist with federal foreign
policy. Responding to this claim, Ramsey develops a theory of presidential
power to preempt state foreign policy laws-preemption authority that Ramsey
suggests may exist independent of any Congressional delegation.23 3 State law
that "impedes the President's exercise of a constitutional power" is unconstitutional.2 34 Ramsey's reasoning is confined to foreign affairs, over which Article
II of the Constitution arguably vests the Executive with independent authoreasily could be extended to cover the
ity. 235 Nevertheless, the theory's logic 236
law.
the
execute
to
authority
President's
If one accepts either the Wayman-McCulloch or the Ramsey theory, one must
confront some difficult questions both about the extent of the executive immunity from state regulation and about how the immunity relates to Congress's
general preemption power. First, if an agency's immunity exists initially, can
Congress waive it? In McCulloch, for example, could Congress have agreed to
state taxation of the federal bank?
Congress had the power to shut down the bank altogether, so it is probably
correct to assume that Congress could have approved a lesser interference with
the bank's functions.2 37 On the other hand, Chief Justice Marshall's theory in
Wayman seems to have envisioned a sphere of constitutional immunity beyond

230. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
231. McCulloch does not support this theory, because the agency in question (i.e., the bank)
probably did not constitute an arm of the Executive. It seems to have been more of a private institution
chartered by Congress to serve national goals.
232. See Michael Ramsey, The Power of the States in ForeignAffairs: The OriginalistCasefor (and
Against) Foreign Policy Federalism,75 NoTRE DAME L. REv. (forthcoming Winter 1999).
233. See id. at 53. We note, in fairness, that Ramsey ultimately does not adopt this theory, but rather
simply offers it as a possibility.
234. Id. In the one Supreme Court case touching upon the issue, Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429
(1968), the Court found a constitutional preclusion of state regulation of foreign affairs, without relying
upon any evidence of congressional intention to preempt state action, because the state law intruded
into a field the "Constitution entrusts to the Presidentand the Congress." Id. at 432 (emphasis added).
235. Ramsey, supra note 232, at 53.
236. Indeed, because Congress and the Executive share constitutional authority in most areasCongress to legislate and the Executive to administer--one could argue that the executive preemption
authority, or immunity from state interference with its administrative functions, always exists.
237. See, e.g., First Agric. Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339, 346 (1968) (holding that
federal statute defines extent to which state may tax national bank); Van Brocklin v. Anderson, 117 U.S.
151, 175 (1886) (holding that federal government property is immune from state taxation unless
Congress authorizes such taxation).
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Congress's authority.2 38 Would this immunity be waivable by the agency itself?
If not, what are the contours of the agency immunity?
Second, assuming that Congress does ultimately control the decision of when
the operation of federal institutions requires the preemption of state law, how
must Congress exercise its ability to consent to state regulation? Must Congress
state explicitly in which respects states may regulate the initially immune
agency? Or does a blanket waiver, like the CPA suffice?
For reasons we have already discussed, we do not resolve these issues here.
But characterized in this way, the application of the issues to the CPA become
both simpler and more complex. At one level, it seems obvious that if Congress
may control preemption, it has waived the immunity in the CPA. But that
conclusion gives rise to our third jurisdictional complication: The CPA may
delegate congressional legislative authority to states in an unconstitutional way.
C. DELEGATION OF FEDERAL POWER TO THE STATES

The CPA delegates to states the powers to decide when to regulate federal
attorneys, now or in the future, without exercising or retaining specific congressional oversight over the interference with federal functions. In other areas,
courts have limited Congress's power to delegate its legislative authority. 239 The
CPA thus must be analyzed with a view toward the improper delegation
40
2

cases.

It is important to note the difference between the preemption and delegation

238. In Wayman, Justice Marshall repeatedly acknowledged the power of Congress to prescribe rules
for the federal courts. See 23 U.S. (10 Wheat) 1, 50 (1825). At the same time, Marshall characterized
the possibility of state regulation of the federal courts as "extravagant," even in the absence of federal
legislation forbidding or preempting such regulation. Id. at 49.
239. See, e.g., Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 758-59 (1996) (holding that Congress may not
delegate legislative authority); Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991) ("Congress may not
constitutionally delegate its legislative power to another branch"); United States v. Shreveport Grain &
Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 85 (1932) (same); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) ("That Congress
cannot delegate legislative power to the President is a principle universally recognized as vital to the
integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the constitution.").
240. The chief theoretical objection to congressional delegation is that it enables Congress to shift
accountability for legislation from itself to the states. Cf Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American
Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 671, 673-75 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (discussing policies
against delegation of congressional authority and urging broader use of the nondelegation doctrine). See
generally GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 105-08 (1998) (setting forth arguments for
and against enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine). Chief Justice Marshall expressed a form of this
objection in Wayman, 23 U.S. at 48, noting that because state legislators did not have in mind the
interests of the whole union, they could not regulate federal agencies or exercise federal authority that
belonged to all citizens. For discussions of the objection, see DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT
RESPONSmILITY: How CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 102 (1993) (arguing that
delegation allows Congress to avoid responsibility for its actions); Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the
Unitary Executive: CongressionalDelegationsofAdministrative Authority Outside the FederalGovernment, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 62, 76 (1990) (arguing that delegation to states eliminates constitutional
checks and balances); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Cooperative Federalism, The Delegation of Federal Power
and the Constitution, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 205, 209-10, 270-80 (1997) (arguing against permitting
congressional delegation of power to the states).
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issues. If states have residual authority to regulate federal prosecutors, the issue
clearly is one of preemption; namely, has Congress implicitly or explicitly
24 If, on
removed from the states the right to exercise their residual authority?
the other hand, Congress has exclusive power to regulate federal prosecutors-if states could not regulate even if Congress abandoned the field-then
the issue becomes one of delegation.24 2
The broad character of the CPA heightens the potential delegation problem. If
the CPA merely subjected prosecutors to existing state law, one could make the
argument that Congress was incorporating the state law as its own by reference. 243 By deferring to states even with respect to future legislation, however,
CPA
the CPA eliminates the argument that Congress was itself legislating. 2The
44
behalf.
Congress's
on
legislate
to
authority
the
states
specifically gives
241. See, e.g., In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 548-50 (1891) (holding that Congress did not improperly
delegate when the state possessed sufficient power to regulate in the absence of preemption). This
distinction stems from Chief Justice Marshall's decision in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1
(1824). In striking down a state's regulation of interstate commerce, Marshall presumed that Congress
could not authorize state legislation contravening the "dormant" Commerce Clause. Marshall's theory
was that Congress had no power to delegate its own regulatory authority to the states. See id. at 207-09;
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (1 How.) 299, 318 (1851).
242. See, e.g., Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920) (forbidding Congress from
delegating authority over exclusively federal matter).
William Cohen suggests a slightly different way of looking at the issue. See William Cohen,
CongressionalPower to Validate UnconstitutionalState Laws: A Forgotten Solution to an Old Enigma,
35 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1983). Professor Cohen argues that, even if states have no residual power to
regulate, Congress has, or should have, the power to remove federalism restrictions on the states if
Congress itself would have the power to regulate directly. See id. at 388. While admitting a split in the
relevant authorities, Cohen takes the position that Congress may authorize what would otherwise be
unconstitutional state law. See id.
243. See, e.g., Cooley, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 318 (holding that Congress could have adopted a
previous state regulation of interstate commerce as its own, but could not prospectively authorize states
to promulgate such regulation); cf Loving 517 U.S. at 777 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that Congress
may never delegate its legislative function, but that usually assignments of authority do not rise to the
level of such a delegation); In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. at 562-64 (Congress may authorize a state to
regulate interstate commerce by removing a bar to state regulation deriving from congressional
silence).
244. The CPA, therefore, calls to mind the specific situation addressed by Chief Justice Marshall in
Wayman, 23 U.S. at 47-48. Marshall held that Congress could incorporate by reference prior state law
in regulating federal courts. However, because states had no residual power to regulate federal courts,
Congress could not delegate to states the power to adopt future legislation governing federal court
practice. See id. at 48.
The courts sometimes have conceptualized this distinction in another way. When Congress assigns
general rulemaking functions to another public or private regulator, courts have looked to whether the
secondary regulator is acting under Congress's supervision or must adhere to some guiding principle
established by Congress. See, e.g., Sunshine Anthracite Coal v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 387-88 (1940)
(approving delegation because private rulemaking was accomplished under federal "surveillance");
Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928) (upholding delegation where Congress provided
"intelligible principle" to govern exercise of delegated power); cf. Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United
States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813) (holding that delegation of fact-finding to President was
permissible so long as Congress maintained control of making of substantive policy). In practice,
however, the courts seem to have accepted congressional delegations that leave policymaking to other
branches or state regulators. See Sarnoff, supra note 240, at 244-48.
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The CPA therefore raises a tricky constitutional question. Most delegation
precedent involves situations in which Congress has delegated power to decide
an issue to another federal branch.24 5 Whether courts would apply those directly
analogous decisions to the federal-state context is unclear.24 6
It is not altogether unusual for Congress to prospectively incorporate state
law. For example, federal bankruptcy law refers to property exemptions in state
law, 24 7 and federal banking law incorporates state usury provisions. 248 These
and other provisions are justified based on the principle of promoting comity, or
deference, to state legislative processes. 24 9 However, most of this legislation is
highly specific, incorporating only a single aspect of nonfederal legislation. In
only one distinguishable case has the Supreme
Court upheld prospective incorpo250
ration of a general body of state law.
One related line of cases does involve state-federal delegation, but viewed
from the perspective of whether federal mandates impose undue burdens on
the states. Some federal legislation gives states the authority to enforce particu-

245. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,.371-72 (1989) (reaffirming that Congress
may not delegate its legislative power to another branch, but finding that Congress had not done so). In
practice, the Supreme Court rarely has struck down an effort by Congress to assign other branches
rulemaking authority as a violation of the nondelegation doctrine. See Neil Kinkopf, Of Devolution,
Privatization,and Globalization: Separation of Powers Limits on CongressionalAuthority to Assign
FederalPower to Non-federal Actors, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 331, 359 n. 168 and authorities cited therein
(1998).
246. Neither the text nor the structure of the constitution definitively answer the question. See
Sarnoff, supra note 240, at 222-38 (describing the constitutional arguments). For an argument that
delegation to nonfederal actors is permissible, see Kinkopf, supra note 245, and compare Cohen, supra
note 242 (arguing that Congress may lend states authority to act even where states could not
constitutionally act on their own). For an argument that such delegations should be impermissible, see
Sarnoff, supra note 240, at 271-80.
247. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (1994).
248. See 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1994).
249. See Kinkopf, supra note 245, at 362 (discussing these and other examples).
250. In United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286 (1958), the Court considered a federal law that
incorporated state criminal law for federal enclaves located in the state. See id. at 291. The need for
such legislation was clear. See id. To prevent federal enclaves from being targets for crime, Congress
either needed to adopt a separate criminal code for federal enclaves or to incorporate state law. See id.
at 293-96. Comity and competence considerations militated in favor of the latter approach. To limit
Congress to incorporating existing state law, and thereby requiring Congress to monitor state law and
adopt new legislation each time any state amended its criminal laws, would have placed a significant
burden on Congress. See id. at 293-94, 296; see also United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 547
(1975) (applying Sharpnack to idiosyncratic context of sovereign tribal jurisdictions); Sarnoff, supra
note 240, at 249-50 (discussing Sharpnack and Mazurie).
There is no similar need for Congress to act upon the subject matter of the CPA. Indeed, it is not even
clear what body of state law the CPA is incorporating. See supra text accompanying note 60. Unlike the
regulation of crime, states have little substantive interest in the regulation of federal prosecutors. Some
comity concerns may exist, but not nearly to the same extent as in Sharpnack.Moreover, as a practical
matter, regulating federal prosecutorial ethics would not be nearly so burdensome for Congress,
particularly because alternate federal regulators (i.e., the federal courts and the Department of Justice)
already are in place to fill in the gaps in the law.
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lar federal laws. 251 The recent decision in Printz v. United States252 suggests
that there are limits on Congress's ability to assign enforcement authority to
state governments.25 3 Printz, however, involved legislation different in character
from the CPA-legislation through which the federal government forced state
governments to act on its behalf.254 Courts generally have upheld voluntary
delegations against claims that the delegations are ultra vires.2 55
One might most accurately characterize the CPA as a statute that delegates
lawmaking power that the states implicitly agree to assume when they promulgate laws covering federal prosecutors. 256 In New York v. United States, 257 the
Supreme Court upheld the federal government's power to offer inducements to
states to implement federal law, provided that the states remain free to accept or
reject those inducements.25 8 Yet in New York, again, the Court was deciding the
federalism question of whether Congress had gone too far in constraining the
states.2 59 The Court did not even consider the delegation issue of whether
Congress exceeded its lawmaking authority in deferring to state rule. The CPA
squarely presents this issue.26 °
251. For example, states are authorized by Congress to hear cases involving and to enforce the
federal civil rights statutes. See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283-84, n.7 (1980) (state courts
may entertain federal civil rights actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Howlett ex rel. Howlett v.
Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 358 (1990) (state courts must entertain jurisdiction over section 1983 cases that
resemble similar state-law actions); see also Steven H. Steinglass, The Emerging State Court § 1983
Action: A ProceduralReview, 38 U. MIAMi. L. REV. 381, 386-99 (1984) (recommending that civil
rights plaintiffs bring their claims in state court). For a discussion on whether or not state courts have an
obligation to hear federal civil rights claims, see Kenneth J. Wilbur, Note, ConcurrentJurisdictionand
Attorney's Fees: The Obligation of State Courts to Hear Section 1983 Claims, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1207
(1986).
252. 521 U.S. 98 (1997).
253. See id.; see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 174-83 (1992) (striking down
aspects of Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1985). See generally Evan H. Caminker, State
Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law,
95 COLuM. L. REV. 1001 (1995) (arguing that such directives are constitutional).
254. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 923 n. 12 (distinguishing forced assignments of federal authority to state
officials from voluntary assignments).
255. See, e.g., Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 389-94 (1947) (upholding federal requirement that state
courts accept jurisdiction over claims arising under federal price-ceiling statute); CHARLES A. WRIGrr,
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 45, 47, at 288-89, 296-306 (5th ed. 1994) (cataloguing cases and
minimizing the exception that state courts may avoid jurisdiction if they have "a valid excuse").
256. See Kinkopf, supra note 245, at 343 (discussing cases involving consensual assignments of
power).
257. 505 U.S. 144.
258. See id. at 145 (upholding right of Congress to offer states incentives to comply with federal
legislation).
259. See id. at 145-46.
260. The issue, of course, is a difficult one. There is some authority to the effect that Congress may
not defer. See, e.g., Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924) (striking down congressionally
authorized state workers compensation laws applicable to shore-based maritime employees because
Congress had exclusive authority to regulate compensation for injuries on navigable waters); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920) (same for law governing water-based employees);
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) discussed supra note 241. On the other hand, some
courts have taken the position in analogous situations that if Congress can regulate in an area,
congressional recognition of state regulation creates a "coordination" of legislation that deserves
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D. CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES

The CPA raises far more questions than it answers-questions that will linger
even if the CPA itself is adjusted or eliminated. The CPA raises serious concerns
about the breadth of Congress's authority to control federal prosecutorial ethics
and to delegate that authority. At the same. time, it inevitably prompts consideration of whether and to what extent federal courts and executive agencies
themselves have authority to promulgate rules governing federal prosecutorial
ethics initially, to preempt state law, and to resist congressional oversight or
control. Now that these issues have been invoked, they will become relevant to
virtually any future regulation of federal prosecutorial ethics, adopted by any of
the possible regulators.
The CPA highlights the complexity of the subject matter. If the goal of the
CPA was to clarify the limits of Department of Justice authority, it utterly fails
in that regard. If its goal was to weaken the power of federal prosecutors, it
accomplishes that goal only insofar as it promises to embroil the Justice

Department in satellite litigation for many years to come.26 '
CONCLUSION

The controversy surrounding the Thornburgh Memorandum and Reno Rule
opened the debate concerning the regulation of federal prosecutorial ethics. The

CPA has expanded the controversy and inflamed the rhetoric of affected parties
on both sides. This article has attempted to pierce the rhetoric, to identify the
legal and theoretical issues that the controversy raises, and to clarify the debate.
One conclusion seems clear. The CPA itself is casual and flawed legislation.
The CPA conflates far too many questions, including what should be done with
respect to the Reno Rule, whether federal prosecutors generally are vested with
too much power, who should regulate that power, and from where the authority
to regulate derives. If this article shows nothing else, it shows that the lawmak-

ers, before adopting regulatory legislation, must understand what they are trying
to regulate, why, and in what way. Failure to reach such an understanding can
respect. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 434-36 (1946) (involving congressional authority to states to impose discriminatory tax on insurance premiums). The conflicting
authorities are discussed at length in Cohen, supra note 242, at 389-405.
261. If the Department of Justice were to resist congressional attempts, like the CPA, to limit the
Department's authority to prescribe its own rules of conduct that may give criminal defendants grounds
to challenge prosecutions in court. Cf. United States v. Lopez, 106 F.3d 309, 310 (9th Cir. 1997)
(relating history of unsuccessful challenge to conviction in criminal prosecution because of the
controversy over the no-contacts rules). The Department has already made it clear that it is willing to
commence litigation to challenge local federal rules with which it disagrees. See, e.g., Baylson v.
Disciplinary Bd., 975 F.2d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1992) (rejecting district court's authority to adopt state rule
limiting grand jury subpoenas); United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 664, 667 (1st Cir. 1987) (en banc)
(upholding federal local court rule applying state ethics provision against federal prosecutors); Stem v.
Supreme Judicial Court for Massachusetts, 184 F.R.D. 10 (D. Me. 1999) (suit by U.S. Attorney
challenging state ethics rule regarding subpoenas to attorneys); United States v. Colorado Supreme
Court, 189 F.3d 1281 (10th Cir. 1999) (federal challenge to state rule governing subpoenas to
attorneys); In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 480 (D.N.M. 1992) (rejecting Supremacy Clause argument).
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only lead to generalized legislation, like the CPA, that presents more issues than
it resolves.
This article's analysis also highlights that the regulation of federal prosecutorial ethics is a far more complicated subject than any legislator, regulated party,
or disinterested academic has ever perceived it to be. To date, the Thornburgh
Memorandum and Reno Rule have produced mostly facile assumptions or
claims about the character of federal prosecutors and the powers of various
potential regulators. These have included largely untested assumptions that
federal prosecutors are like other lawyers and untested assertions regarding the
26 3 the authority of
force of the Supremacy Clause,26 2 separation of powers,
2 6 the inherent authority of states
Congress to regulate, preempt, and delegate,
265 the inherent authority of federal
to set ethics rules governing all lawyers,
courts to control federal litigation,26 6 the inherent and supervisory authority of
te~inherent authority of the Department of Justice to
267
and the
federal courts,
regulate its own attorneys. The CPA implicates each of these claims. This article
has illustrated the importance of coming to grips with their merits.
The article has not attempted to resolve the issues. Each is worthy of
independent analysis. That is a task not only for academics, but for each of the
potential regulators as well. The article has demonstrated that, as each of the
regulators presses the limits of its own authority-as Congress has done in the
CPA-the incentive of other potential legislators to assert their independent
power grows.
In the past, Congress, the Executive, and the federal judiciary have, for the
most part, restrained their regulation of federal prosecutors so as to accord the
other regulators a measure of independence. Congress has shown deference to
2681
the Department of Justice, federal courts have adopted only limited practice
262. See, e.g., Reno Rule, supra note 25, at 39,916 (arguing that the Supremacy Clause allows
Justice Department regulations to preempt state rules); Lupert, supra note 29, at 1132-36 (rejecting the
Supremacy Clause argument with little analysis); Saylor & Wilson, supra note 29, at 483-85 (asserting
that the Supremacy Clause forecloses application of state ethics rules to federal prosecutors).
263. See generally Reno Rule, supra note 25, at 39,917 ("It would raise significant separation of
powers concerns for a district court to assert supervisory authority to regulate and sanction the conduct
of executive branch attorneys when the Attorney General has adjudged such conduct legitimate and
necessary."); Little, supra note 21, at 409-10 (making a separation of powers argument against judicial
regulation of the out-of-court ethics of federal prosecutors).
264. See generally Zacharias, supra note 7, at 454-45 (assuming Congress's power to make rule or
to preempt and delegate); Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEx. L. REV. 335 (1994)
(discussing the power of Congress to federalize legal ethics).
265. See, e.g., Dash, supra note 29, at 138-39 ("Since the founding of the Republic, the licensing
and regulation of lawyers has been left exclusively to the states."); cf Monroe Freedman, Dirty Pool in
the Prosecutor's Office, LEGAL TiMES, Sept. 24, 1990, at 24 (expressing the author's and the ABA's
position that state ethics rules apply to all lawyers, including prosecutors).
266. See generally Green, supra note 103, at 531 (arguing for increased judicial involvement in
regulating federal attorneys); Mashburn, supra note 21, at 523-26 (raising issues regarding the source
and extent of federal courts' "inherent" powers).
267. See generally Little, supra note 21 (arguing that the inherent power of federal courts is
extremely limited).
268. See, e.g., SUBCOMM. ON Gov'T INFORMATION, JUSTICE, AGRIC., COMM. ON GoV'T OPERATIONS,
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rules, 269 and the Department of Justice has taken steps to accommodate state
and federal regulators even as the Department has made its broadest case for
independent regulatory authority. 270 That approach has avoided confrontation. It
also has avoided
any clear, nonpolitical appraisal of the regulators' claims of
27
authority. '
As the mutual deference dissipates, so will the possibility of sidestepping the
competing claims. The regulators have a choice. They may press their authority,
as Congress has in the CPA. In that event, the courts ultimately will decide the
issues in cases in which they are raised. Alternatively, each branch-including
Congress-may reassess its own authority and, based on that assessment, avoid
a legal confrontation. This article has clarified the pertinent issues. That is the
first step towards resolving them.

FEDERAL PROSECUTORIAL AtrnHoRrrv IN A CHANGING LEGAL ENvmormErTr: MORE ArrENION REQUIRED, H.R. REP. No. 986, at 86 (1990) (recommending no immediate congressional action on
challenged conduct of Department of Justice, promising instead continued oversight).
269. See Rand v. Monsanto Co., 926 F.2d 596, 601-03 (7th Cir. 1991) (collecting and cataloguing
federal district court rules); GILLERs & SIMON, supra note 196, at 591-95 (summarizing local district
court rules on attorney discipline).
270. See supra text accompanying note 26; see also Little, supra note 21, at 424 (encouraging the
Department of Justice to voluntarily forego full implementation of its authority).
271. In other words, because each regulator ultimately has backed off from implementing the full
scope of their asserted powers, no court has ever had to decide the legal issue of whose authority
controls in a case of direct conflict between regulators. Instead, the issues has been argued rhetorically
in public statements, congressional hearings, and sometimes in law review pieces written by authors
aligned with particular views. See, e.g., Little, supra note 21 (authored by former and subsequent
member of the Department of Justice); Saylor and Wilson, supra note 29 (authored by two members of
the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice).

